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I.	  Introduction	  
 The title of this thesis exposes its core question: “What is a human person?” This can be 
translated as a very personal, existential question for each one of us, that being: “What am I?” 
This question has been a subject of debate for millennia, and the answers that have garnered 
people’s allegiance through history fall under two broad categories: “physicalism” and 
“dualism”.  
 By “Physicalism” I mean the idea that everything about human persons, from our mental 
lives to our identity, is entirely determined by and dependent on the physical facts of the world, 
especially the physical facts of the human body. One of the earliest renditions of physicalism was 
the philosophy of the ancient Greek atomists. In their view, all of reality could be explained 
through two principles: atoms and empty space. As a consequence, people were thought to be 
nothing but assemblages of atoms in space; human persons are human bodies.  
 By “Dualism”, I mean, at the least, a denial of physicalism. Not everything about us 
human beings is determined by physical facts of the world or our bodies. Plato’s Phaedo presents 
one of the earliest philosophical endorsements of dualism by arguing for the existence of an 
immaterial mind, or soul, that is the grounds for a human person's identity and responsible for 
our unique mental abilities, such as logical thinking. The idea that a human person is, 
fundamentally, an immaterial mind or soul has also been a long-standing position for many of 
the world’s major religions in both Western and Eastern traditions. 
 My position throughout this thesis will be that of a substance dualist. I maintain that 
human persons are more than just purely material entities. Human persons are to be thought of as 
things distinct in kind from purely physical objects. Most fundamentally, we are immaterial 
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minds, or souls. I use those terms interchangeably throughout because though their meaning 
differs, I will not be concerned with specifying the kind of substance dualism I think is best.1 
 What I will be concerned with in what follows is a critique of physicalism. With 
advances in cognitive science and a recent revival of academic interest in studying 
consciousness, the debate on human nature has been receiving some special treatment. 
Physicalism has emerged as the dominant perspective in academic circles and it has often been a 
presupposition in my undergraduate courses outside the field of philosophy. I will be presenting 
a few of the troubling consequences that physicalism has in relation to epistemology, personal 
identity, and ethics. To close, I will also give a brief apologia by responding to the most 
frequently cited objections to dualism, and point us to how dualism could even contribute to our 
ever-developing scientific understanding of the universe.  
 My conclusion will be that the problems facing physicalism are insuperable, and should 
move us into investigating what sort of substance dualism can resolve these problems.  
 
 
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This is because I have not settled that question for myself. My purpose here is to say that some kind of    
substance dualism is right, and there are many options, just as there are for physicalist theories 
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II.	  A	  Metaphysical	  Argument	  Against	  Physicalism	  
Plantinga’s Replacement Argument (RA hereafter) starts by presenting a possible 
situation where I exist when my body (“B” hereafter) does not. It leads to the conclusion that, 
because of Leibniz’s law of identity and the law of non-contradiction, I am not identical to B, or 
any part of B, since I have the property “possibly exists when B does not” (Plantinga, Against 
Materialism 3). He paints this picture in the first-person, and I will follow the same strategy. The 
idea is that anyone else can go through the same steps, and come to the same conclusion and that 
therefore, no other human person is identical to their body either (Van Inwagen, Plantinga’s 
Replacement 3).2 
There are two presuppositions to the argument that Physicalist metaphysician Peter Van 
Inwagen points out, with which some physicalists would agree. There’s the thesis that “Human 
persons…are substances” (1).3  In addition, the definition of “B” must be neutral with respect to 
both physicalism and dualism. This is necessary if the argument is going to avoid being biased 
for either position. Van Inwagen proposes this definition, which I’ll also assume:  
“My body =df the living human organism such that it is possible for me to bring about 
changes in that organism without bringing about changes in any other organism (other 
than such organisms as it may have as proper parts)—and which is such that causing 
changes in it can cause changes in me and in no other person”(5).  
With these two preliminaries in place we can go on to state the argument. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For those who don’t there will be other arguments presented for why other ontology’s of human 
persons, or criteria for identity, are unsatisfactory in major ways.  
3 Van Inwagen gives some characteristics constitutive of substances: “…they persist through time, 
retaining their identities while changing various of their accidental properties; they are not 
grammatical fictions; they are not “modes of substance”; they are not logical constructs on shorter-
lived things (they are not entia successiva); they are not abstract objects (they are not, for example, 
things analogous to computer programs); they are not events or processes (Van Inwagen 3).” 
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There is a “macro” and “micro” version of the argument, and since Van Inwagen presents 
an argument against the macro version that he says applies equally to the micro version, I’ll 
concentrate on the macro version. First, this picture occurs in a possible world that is not ours, 
with certain peculiarities that, strange as they are, are not impossible. At any given time in this 
world, one hemisphere of my brain is responsible for the totality of the processes and functions 
we usually suppose are done by the whole brain, including memory storage and recollection, and 
the other half is dormant, a literal space filler.4  
Let’s say then, that I am reading an article in the University of Rhode Island’s student 
news paper, The Good 5 cent Cigar, about a peacock that escaped from the zoo. At midnight, in 
the middle of my reading the second panel, the following process occurs: Every part of my body, 
starting with my feet and continuing up with every regional part (legs, waist and torso, arms, 
neck), is replaced by a new part in succession (via any method you wish, Plato’s Demiurge, 
some advanced alien medical technology), all the normal connections of the old part are re-
established between the new parts and the rest of the body, all the way up to my brain. The way 
this occurs with my brain has specific parameters. The dormant hemisphere, call it H2, is 
replaced by a new hemisphere H2* and H2 is instantly annihilated. After this, the active 
hemisphere, H1,  “transfers” or “copies” all the information to H2*5. Then, H1 is replaced by a 
new hemisphere H1* and annihilated the same way H2 was. This whole process, from toe to 
skullcap, takes one second, and throughout it I continue to read the second panel of the comic 
strip without noticing what has occurred at all (Plantinga, Against Materialism 4).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 We know from real cases that it’s not impossible for the brain to make serious adaptations in the 
location of functions necessary to live, we’re stretching the notion for this exercise.  
5 Plantinga thinks of it as a transfer of information, Van Inwagen gives the analogy of two boards, one 
has (x) switches in specific positions on and the rest off. The second has all switches off. Then the 
second is switched on into the same pattern as the first. Thus the information is “tokened” or “copied” 
onto the dormant hemisphere (5). I don’t know which analogy is closest to the truth of what the brain 
would actually do.  
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Two things must be established for this to bring me to the conclusion that I continue to 
exist though my body does not. The first thing is that my body must really cease to exist during 
the replacement. I may think that, because at every moment during the replacement most of the 
parts of a body are in existence and connected to other parts in much the regular way, that my 
body never ceases to exist and that we’re really just imagining a sped-up situation of something 
that happens all the time naturally (6). This is partially true; all your body parts are replaced over 
time. But the reason that B really does cease to exist is that there is an “assimilation time” for 
any new part of this replacement body, after it is in the appropriate spatial location and has the 
appropriate physical connections, to become a part of B. We can understand assimilation time 
with the example Van Inwagen uses of an eye being placed in an empty socket and being re-
connected to all the appropriate nerve endings. This eye does not immediately become a part of 
my body; there is a causal process it must go through to start functioning in the body the way it is 
supposed to, ie all the relevant chemical processes happening in it (Van Inwagen, Plantinga’s 
Replacement 9). Because this is a causal process, it will take time, and no matter how short the 
time (though it’s definitely longer than one second) one could adjust the RA to make the 
envisioned replacement shorter than it (9).  
So there will be a time, after all of B’s parts have been replaced and annihilated, and 
during which none of the replacement parts have assimilated, that I will have no body. Plantinga 
rests his argument here, and indeed if I were to grant all of the above, most of which seems 
possible, then Plantinga’s argument should compel me to believe that I am not identical to my 
body. However, Van Inwagen poses a relevant objection: “Why should I accept…that I should 
continue to exist throughout the…interval that contained the one-microsecond replacement 
episode” (10). The argument does seem to assume that I will continue to exist while this process 
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happens. Van Inwagen points out that the hidden argument for this belief is that “During 
the…interval, a single episode of conscious awareness occurs. If a single episode of conscious 
awareness occurs during a certain interval, a single person must be the subject of that episode. I 
am the subject of the earlier parts of this episode. Since a single person is the subject of the 
whole episode, I am therefore the subject of the final parts this episode” (11). But, according to 
Van Inwagen, what I should expect as I read the article during this replacement is for my 
consciousness to cease. I should expect the same results I would expect if I were “vaporized by 
the explosion of a hydrogen bomb”, so far as my consciousness is concerned  (11). Further, Van 
Inwagen thinks that in the scenario painted someone will come into existence who believes that 
they had read the peacock article to the climactic end of its being found in a chicken coop, but 
they would be deceived (11). They are in fact having false memories copied from my H1, and I 
am now dead, whatever dead means for Van Inwagen6        
I respond with two things that I believe are relevant to Van Inwagen’s objections and to 
anyone who would feel as though, because they have a commitment to physicalism, this 
argument cannot have any force and they should simply cross their arms in defiance. The first is 
that I do not believe that Van Inwagen’s objection to how this argument proposes we find out 
whether a conscious thinker exists behind a continuous conscious experience is forceful. 
Let’s say that we were able to actually perform this replacement via some star-trek 
technology that, instead of converting my body to energy and then re-using it to form the same 
body, configures the exact state of my body, and then performs a replacement of the kind 
described above in rapid succession, annihilating my old body. Now this happens to me as I 
stand in a lab, three feet away from Van Inwagen (who in this world is a scientist!), debating 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Considering his belief in the Christian doctrine of a future resurrection of all human persons who have 
ever lived. 
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with him whether metaphysician Stephen Hawking has been able to provide successful 
definitions of what an “individual material thing” is. Right after the replacement is done, Van 
Inwagen the scientist explains to me what has just happened and then claims that I am not the 
person who was talking to him three minutes ago. The reason he will give me for believing that I 
am not that person is that he believes I could not have continued to exist through the 
replacement, because I am necessarily my body. However, if I remember everything that has 
happened over the past three minutes, remember all the words of our conversation, and certainly 
do not recall any loss of consciousness, then where does that put Van Inwagen?     
Van Inwagen objects to the idea of finding out whether a continuous conscious person 
exists during the replacement by asking the replacement person whether they were conscious the 
whole time, but I see no other way to find out besides merely assuming either physicalism or 
dualism (12). So, going back to my lab situation, Van Inwagen, and all physicalists, would have 
to hold the commitment to physicalism although the only relevant empirical data, my feeling that 
I have endured throughout the past three minutes, seems to falsify this commitment.    
Obviously, this response is not meant to settle the argument, and a physicalist may not be 
moved by it. But I do think it’s relevant, since many physicalists place so much importance on 
the results of experiments and relevant fields of science to provide support for their positions. It 
would be awkward for a physicalist to object to this argument because of skepticism about 
human technological capabilities in the future. If that were given up, then, in this hypothetical 
outcome of such an experiment, they’d find themselves at odds with the only source of data. 
Perhaps, if anything, this will soften up some physicalist's hardcore empiricism to see that their 
position rests on something more than just “evidence”.   
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A more philosophical reason to why I think Van Inwagen’s objection is not persuasive is 
that the replacement could occur while I am asleep and not dreaming. In that case, I would not 
appeal to my continued consciousness for the belief that I am still the same person that has 
existed throughout the experiment. I would simply appeal to my experience of being the same 
person. I would have absolutely no reason for doubting that I am in fact the same person who has 
existed for the past 21 years, as much as the physicalist scientist who invented this technology 
will try to tell me otherwise. In fact, I believe that if anyone were to put themselves in my shoes 
at that moment, they would see why the replacement argument offers a real door to believing that 
they are not identical to their body. The fact is, such a rapid replacement as the one I’m now 
talking about could have happened to all of us thousands of times in our lives and nothing at all 
would be different (except for the existence of some conspiratorial group of scientists 
responsible for these ongoing experiments, I suppose that’s a big deal). 
Plantinga calls this argument for dualism an “argument from possibility”. I believe that 
after adding the two possible scenarios above, Van Inwagen’s admission that he has “…not said 
anything that should convince anyone that either of these premises is false [the premise that a 
continuous conscious episode would occur during the replacement and that I, therefore, would 
continue to exist during the replacement] ” becomes problematic for anyone who still wishes to 
maintain the belief that they are identical with their body (12). This argument sets down 
groundwork for the fact that there are more than just empirical considerations in the physicalist 
thesis and the arguments in the following sections for why human persons cannot be purely 
material entities are a force to be reckoned with. 
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III.	  Can	  a	  Purely	  Physical	  Thing	  Have	  Beliefs?	  
The first epistemological objection to physicalism is that no purely physical thing could 
ever have a belief, and that attempts to make this seem plausible fail in one respect or another. 
Plantinga also develops an attack against the larger materialist enterprise based on this thesis, 
and I'll expound that argument for my purposes contra physicalism. If a physicalist thinks that 
there are such things as beliefs (some philosophers don’t, and I will deal with this idea 
separately) then they will usually think of them as “neuronal events”. They will have 
neurophysiologic properties7 ('NP properties' from here on) and content. The content of a belief is 
“what it says about the world” (Brown)8. Plantinga explains that every belief has a proposition as 
its content. So, my belief that the Miami Heat will win the NBA playoffs in 2011 has as its 
content the proposition “the Miami Heat will win the NBA playoffs in 2011.” Having those two 
terms at hand will help the rest of the way.  
Here’s a blunt way to put the problem to the physicalist: We can see that my belief that 
“the number 7 is prime” is about the number 7. But can, say, a tree trunk be about something? 
Can any artifact be about something? Can the atoms that make up an ancient city, in and of 
themselves, be about something? No.  
However, there can be indication and indicator meaning, and physicalists all too often 
confuse these with belief and belief-content while trying to accommodate beliefs in their view on 
human nature (21). A tree trunk can indicate to a human that another human has been there 
before (say, by the clean cut resembling the work of a chainsaw), but there's no way for the tree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 These are all the physical properties (neurons firing in a certain pattern in a certain place etc.) pertaining 
to the state of x's brain that are directly relevant to the belief “p” belonging to x., without which x 
would still be the completely the same except for the fact that they would no longer believe “p”. 
8 I assume that narrow mental content is the best way to conceive of this and I give an argument against 
Putnam’s attempt to eliminate narrow mental content in the next section.  
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trunk to be about that human who once cut it. In the same way, our brains are made of physical 
particles, and there’s no way for a neuronal event to give rise to or be the “aboutness” of our 
beliefs (21).  The same goes for the artifacts and the ancient city. The ancient city indicates to an 
archeologist the presence of humans in the area at some previous time, and the archaeologist’s 
belief that this is so has content that is about the city and that group of people. This is pretty 
straightforward.  
 Usually, an “indicator” is a natural sign of some other event because of causal or nomic 
connection (21). Smoke is caused by fire, thus it indicates that there is a fire is below the 
smokestack (21). The smell of hotdogs and burgers indicate a nearby barbecue, or town fair. Our 
bodies have internal indicators of blood pressure and saline levels. Obviously, none of these 
indicators are beliefs. So, how would a belief arise from indication? 
 Frogs have neuronal indicators of a fly when it flies by. We have a pattern of neuronal 
firing that goes on when we see, or are looking at, a tree. That tree being there, in part, causes the 
firing pattern (21). We can allow (for the moment) that such indicators could carry “content”: 
“whatever it is that the structure indicates on that occasion” (22). This goes for our neural state 
when looking at a tree, its content is that there’s a tree in front of us. We could also say that the 
indicators carry “information”. However, being this loose should also allow us to say that my 
blood’s saline-level indicators carry the content of whatever level of saline we have in our blood 
(22). This obviates it that indicator content has nothing to do with “belief, or belief content” (23). 
 In an attempt to hide this distinction, some philosophers talk about knowledge-gaining 
systems, or of evolution as an information gathering process, but no causal correlation entails 
belief. The information that is potentially in a system is not knowledge until it is believed. A 
thermometer does not believe anything about the temperature; whatever structure indicates the 
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saline content in my blood does not believe anything about it. Let us label the distinctions: the 
saline level indicators, or our neuronal indicators of the tree, can have indicator content but not 
belief content (23). 
 I must believe the content of my indicator for it to be a belief. There are times when I 
see something, but don’t believe that my senses indicate to me what is really there. Say I see a 
Republican campaign poster for governor and the face on it is a splitting image of my friend Jim, 
but Jim’s a libertarian. Though my senses indicate something, I don’t believe their indicator 
content. Thus, it’s not enough to explain belief content by simply equating it to indication 
content.  
 Someone may claim that a computer’s memory can store the sentence “That humans are 
more than their bodies is an antiquated belief.” That sentence has as its content the proposition 
“That humans are more than their bodies is an antiquated belief”. So doesn’t this mean that a 
material object can have propositional content? (24) Well, No. 
 These are cases of derived content. Sentences have derived content, the sounds we use 
are arbitrary and only meaningful by being put to use by humans, who already think and have 
primary content in their thoughts. The structure in the computer has derived content because we 
assign that configuration, and the resulting symbols, that content. Imagine if humans never 
existed. Now let’s say a spontaneously assembled computer gathers a bunch of data through an 
artificial “eye” and consistently expresses the colors in front of its “eye” by words appearing on 
the screen. Does the computer believe the words appearing? No. It would be nothing more than a 
very sophisticated mirror, or interactive part, of the environment9. The computer will not believe 
or think that it is seeing red. It will just indicate that there’s something red in front of it by having 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  I suppose I am denying such a view of humans, and inadvertently presenting another looming danger for 
the physicalist, the loss of personal agency. 
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the words “red” pop up on the screen. If God created the first human being on this planet and 
they discovered the correlation between the words on the screen and the colors the computer 
sees, they may come to have a belief with the content “when the letters ‘r e d’ appear on the 
computer screen, there’s something red in front of the computer.  
 All this being said, there is another objection that Peter Van Inwagen brings against this 
fairly powerful argument against physicalism. Van Inwagen thinks that dualism suffers from the 
same inability that plagues physicalists in trying to explain how a physical thing could think. 
How does a dualist explain how a non-material thing could think?  He contends: 
 It is just that it is a bit easier to see that thinking is a mystery when we suppose that the 
thing that does the thinking is physical, for we can form mental images of the operations 
of a physical thing and we can see that the physical interactions represented in these 
images—the only interactions that can be represented in these images—have no 
connection with thought or sensation, or none we are able to imagine, conceive or 
articulate. The only reason we do not readily find the notion of a non-physical thing that 
thinks equally mysterious is that we have no clear procedure for forming mental images 
of non-physical things. (Van Inwagen, Metaphysics 26) 
 That thinking is a mysterious activity is a given, whether or not one view makes it more 
mysterious than another is irrelevant to the truth of the matter. But to respond, I cannot form a 
mental image of many things that I still believe exist or are true. I cannot form a mental image of 
“the number’s 79 being prime” but I know that the number 79 is prime. Even if we grant that we 
imagine faint “images” of numerals when we think of numbers, then having a mental image of 
something has nothing to do with possibility, because I can have a mental image of other things 
that are impossible, like the proposition “the number 79 is prime” being the color red10. The point 
is that one does not think it’s impossible for a physical thing to have beliefs based on an inability 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 This is impossible because a proposition is content, and content can be translated, so my image is of the 
symbols.  
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to picture it. It’s based on apprehension of impossibility, coupled with empirical evidence11. 
There is no equal apprehension for dualism. If there was, Plantinga points out a somewhat 
ridiculous result: “we'd have a quick and easy argument against the existence of God: no 
immaterial thing can think; if there were such a person as God, he would be both immaterial and 
a thinker; therefore…” (Against Materialism 30). 
 That’s the offhand response to the physicalist. Van Inwagen also says that we cannot 
form any representation of how a physical or non-physical reality could undergird thought and 
sensation, so physicalism and dualism are again on par. This is not a problem for dualists. For the 
physicalist, thought is produced by the workings of parts, so a representation of how beliefs are 
produced makes sense. The dualist believes that persons do this by virtue of the basic property of 
being able to think, entertain propositions, and believe. And, lest someone say that this is a cop-
out, basic properties are common to our understanding of the world and often go unquestioned. 
Electrons, for example, have the basic property of having a negative electric charge (32). 
Propositions have similar properties, two of them can be related to each other logically, and it’s 
hard to explain how in physical terms, or explain it at all except by apprehending it is a brute 
fact. The same is true of the human person, they can think and believe because it is a part of their 
nature (32).  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Apprehension that thoughts are about something, coupled with the fact that physical things are not 
about anything, for example.  
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III.	  Intentionality	  
Picture the earth before any human walked its surface. Now, take anything there and, as 
we did in the previous section, ask the question “Is x about anything else? “ Is a tree about the 
ground, or the animals living in it, or any other physical thing? No, a tree is not about anything, it 
simply exists and interacts with its environment according to the relevant physical laws. Now 
contrast that with the fact that when you are thinking and asking the question, “Is the tree about 
anything else?” you are having a thought about that imaginary tree. This “aboutness” is also 
called “intentionality”. Now consider the fact that every thought you have is intentional, it is 
directed to something in the universe. At this moment, you are probably having a thought about 
this sentence, or a thought about the fact that your thoughts are about things. Thoughts are like 
that, they have a non-dispositional property of being about things. (Being a non-dispositional 
property just means that this property of intentionality cannot be further analyzed.)  
If humans are wholly material beings, how is it that thoughts, which presumably are also 
material entities, have the property of intentionality? As Geoffrey Madell has stated “…it is quite 
unclear what an analysis of a thought’s directedness to an object could possibly amount to” 
(Mind 11). Say we are looking at all the neurons in some person’s brain as they look at a tree. 
Those events made up, ultimately, of subatomic particles are not about anything in the way that 
this person’s thought “That tree is an oak.” is about the tree in front of them. The tree itself is 
made up of the same kind of particles that this person’s brain is. If we see the impossibility of 
any configuration in the tree to have the property of intentionality, we can similarly recognize the 
parallel difficulty in what it would mean for any physical state in the brain to be about anything 
else. It seems as though the non-dispositional property of intentionality that thoughts have is 
irreducible to any physical description, and thus any physical explanation.  
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In general, the three responses of physicalists to this are: 
 
1. Despite the almost a priori difficulty, to say that these intentional states are in some broad 
sense identical to certain physical states and then to analyze these states into being dispositional 
(functionalist accounts are thought by some philosophers to fit into this category). 
2. To admit that though these states are irreducible, this does not present any serious problems 
for materialism, and then to either analyze these states into being dispositional, or not do much of 
anything (versions of functionalism can fit here also).  
3. To say that we should abandon all notions of intentional mental states (for example, stop 
thinking that there are such things as beliefs) as part of an antiquated view of human thought 
processes. These are “eliminativist” views. Many under this broad umbrella recognize the 
difficulty in reducing intentionality into anything else, but would simply state that concepts like 
“beliefs”, which manifest irreducible intentionality, are illusory.  
 
I have sectioned off my analyses of different philosophers’ takes on this issue to make it easier 
for anyone who is interested in a particular philosopher I critique, and to simply make it easier 
for you to stop and come back to these arguments. 
Hilary Putnam and “Twin Earth” 
One landmark objection raised to the dualist idea of intrinsic intentionality has to do with 
what’s called “the externality of the mind”. For those familiar with the idea, I will not be dealing 
with that thesis as a whole, but rather only in its relation to intentionality. In Reason, Truth and 
History philosopher Hilary Putnam contends, “No set of mental events are sufficient, or even 
necessary, for understanding and reference” (quoted in Madell, Mind 15). What Putnam says 
could be grouped under response number 1 in the previous section. There is a direct implication 
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of this proposal for intentionality as we’ve construed it thus far. Mental events that are 
intentional (thoughts, beliefs, specific fears, etc.) are usually thought of as being used to 
understand and refer to the things in the world as a direct result of their being intentional. My 
belief “Snow leopards are the most majestic felines on earth” refers to snow leopards simply 
because beliefs have the ability to refer. We can refer because we have thoughts that are 
intrinsically intentional. We can vocalize some of these thoughts through sounds that our 
linguistic communities have agreed denote certain objects, in my case “snow leopards” for the 
most majestic feline on earth. But, if in fact these states are not used to refer, if, as Putnam says, 
they’re not even necessary, it seems as though our notion of intentionality is placed on a 
fundamentally mistaken view of these mental states.  
Putnam argues that the reason concepts refer to things is that there are necessary physical 
connections between a subject and the outside world, these physical connections are what the 
“intentionality” of thought can be broken down to mean, and without them reference is not 
possible. In section 6 of his chapter “Brains in a Vat” Putnam defends his idea that referring to 
something does not require any mental event, that the intentionality of a thought is not an 
intrinsic, un-analyzable, property of thoughts. I agree with George Maddell's assessment of 
Putnam's discussion when he says, “While it begins with a discussion of the notions of reference 
and meaning, towards the end of the chapter we find that what is being discussed is the notion of 
understanding” (Madell, Mind 18). I will treat section 6 of Putnam's chapter piece by piece.  
He starts by saying that “If there are mental representations that necessarily refer to 
external things, they must be of the nature of concepts and not of the nature of images”(Putnam 
396). Putnam clouds much of the issue by concentrating on images together with concepts. He 
states that if an alien sees an image of a tree, it's not a representation of a tree because there is no 
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causal interaction between the alien and real trees. I disagree. The real reason the image is not a 
representation of a tree is that the alien has not thought of the image as representing a tree 
(Madell 16). As Putnam says: “images do not necessarily refer”, and that’s the primary reason 
why the image of the tree doesn’t refer to trees, for the alien. But if one could explain what a tree 
is to the alien, and tell them that the image they see is of a tree, then the image would represent 
trees, admittedly still imaginary things to the alien.  
Moving forward though, Putnam claims that he could imagine someone “thinking just 
these words and having just the feeling of understanding, asserting, etc., that I do, and realizing a 
minute later (or on being awakened by a hypnotist) that he did not understand what had just 
passed through his mind at all, that he did not understand the language these words are in” 
(Putnam 397). Because this is supposedly possible, Putnam claims that therefore to say that 
someone is having a thought, or has a concept, is not to say they are having an introspective 
mental event, because the concepts that make up, or are thoughts, can occur in someone who has 
no idea what they mean. So really, concepts, and thoughts, are signs that do not intrinsically 
refer, they require something additional (causal connection between the thinker and referent).  
But, the person Putnam asks us to envision is almost absurd, and surprisingly close to an 
example which would count as a mere “physical possibility”, which he critiques elsewhere in his 
chapter. If someone really was “saying these words in his mind”, and felt like they understood 
them, I have no idea what this “feeling of understanding” would be if not a thought about the 
words, because in my experience, feeling like I understand a word comes hand in hand with 
having a thought about the word, an intentional thought. Even if we grant that this person had a 
“feeling of understanding” and that they later realized they did not actually understand, they still 
had a thought about a bunch of words, about a bunch of arbitrary signs. That the words did not 
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refer to something because they did not understand them, is a different issue. Putnam says that 
this example shows that quote “the sign apart from its use is not the concept. And signs do not 
intrinsically refer”(397). If what Putnam means is that if someone says a word (a sign) in their 
mind, without knowing how to use the word, then they do not have the concept, nor do they 
understand the word, I agree. But, Putnam admits that private mental entities like thoughts are 
possible, and if he means that a thought involving a word (a sign), or a bunch of words, that I do 
not know how to use, is not intrinsically referential because I do not know how to use the words, 
then I disagree, because such a thought is still intentional, it's about the arbitrary words. 
Putnam goes on to postulate the first of his “Twin Earth” examples to show how 
“meanings aren’t in the head”, and thus that the reference of a term in our thoughts is not 
determined by our mental states, and thus that referring (intentionality) is not an intrinsic quality 
of thoughts. I will quote Putnam’s discussion and label parts of it for my analysis:  
 
“[1] Suppose you are like me and cannot tell an elm tree from a beech tree. [2] We still 
say that the reference of ‘elm’ in my speech is the same as the reference of ‘elm’ in 
anyone else’s, viz. elm trees, and that the set of all beech trees is the extension of ‘beech’ 
(i.e. the set of things the word ‘beech’ is truly predicated of) both in your speech and my 
speech. [3] Is it really credible that the difference between what ‘elm’ refers to and what 
‘beech’ refers to is brought about by a difference in our concepts? My concept of an elm 
tree is exactly the same as my concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess). (This shows 
that the determination of reference is social and not individual, by the way; you and I 
both defer to experts who can tell elms from beeches.) [4] If someone heroically attempts 
to maintain that the difference between the reference of ‘elm’ and the reference of 
‘beech’ in my speech is explained by a difference in my psychological state, then let him 
imagine a Twin Earth where the words are switched…apart from the fact that ‘elm’ and 
‘beech’ are interchanged, the reader can suppose Twin Earth is exactly like Earth. [5] 
Suppose I have a doppelganger on Twin Earth who is molecule for molecule identical 
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with me... [6] If you are a dualist, then suppose my doppelganger thinks the same 
verbalized thoughts I do, has the same sense data, the same dispositions, etc. [7] It is 
absurd to think his psychological state is one bit different from mine: [8] yet his word 
‘elm’ represents beeches, and my word ‘elm’ represents elms… [9] Contrary to a doctrine 
that has been with us since the seventeenth century, meanings just aren’t in the head. 
(Putnam, 397) 
Let’s assume [1] (I in fact do not know what the difference between an elm and a beech 
tree is). We can agree with [2] also, as long as Putnam does not assume that he intends to refer to 
the same thing when he says the word “elm” and the word “beech”. If he intends to refer to the 
same kind of tree when he says “elm” and “beech”, then, to him the referent of the words is the 
same. It doesn’t matter what the whole world thinks, when I say either “elm tree” or “beech tree” 
to him, he thinks I’m talking about the same kind of tree (this is going to be crucial). To [3] one 
should say, yes it is credible, and, no, our concept of elm trees is not the same as our concept of 
beech trees. At the very least (this is the case for myself as I write this), our concept of “elm tree” 
is separated from our concept of “beech tree” by the content “they are not beech trees”.  
Let’s take an inventory of what I just said through some examples, before moving 
launching off to Twin Earth. Suppose Putnam is seeing an elm tree, and says “That’s an elm 
tree”. If he intends to refer to the tree he’s seeing, then we say he is using the term correctly. 
Now suppose Putnam is seeing a birch tree and again says “That’s an elm tree”. If he intends to 
refer to the tree he’s seeing, then we say he is using the term incorrectly. If in these examples 
Putnam does not intend to refer to the same kind of tree when he says “elm” and “birch” (If, as I 
said in reply to [3] he at least has the content “they are not birch trees” as a part of the concept 
“elm tree”) then the meaning of “birch”, he'll agree, is birches. He’ll admit that he used the term 
incorrectly when someone points it out. However, both times, his intent was a matter of his 
mental state and not altered by outside factors. He intended to refer to the tree in front of him, 
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even if he was wrong about what kind of tree it was, and this intention was an intrinsic property 
of his mental state. Now it’s time for take off.  
Obviously, there’s no harm in imagining [4] and [5]. I am a dualist, so I’ll assume [6] is 
true. Here are the clinchers: If [7] is true, then it seems valid to assume that Putnam’s 
doppelganger, like Putnam himself, cannot tell the difference between beeches and elms either. 
However, does Putnam know how to tell an elm tree from an oak tree? If so, then there’s also 
additional sensory content to his concept of “elm”, though he has no additional sensory content 
for his concept of a beech tree, and thus, when he sees them, he just thinks they are elms. These 
two additional considerations suffice to dismantle Putnam’s argument.  
Let’s imagine the doppelganger is standing in front of an elm tree, like Putnam. If the 
doppelganger is in the same psychological state Putnam is in, as [7] says, then when the 
doppelganger says: “That’s an elm tree”, then, if Putnam can distinguish elms from oaks, the 
doppelganger is saying this sentence with the intention of referring to the tree in front of him, 
and he intends to refer to what everyone else on his planet would call “a beech tree”! This is 
because he has the same sensory content as Putnam does for his concept of “elms”. He may not 
have yet learned that what we call “elms” are called “beeches” on Twin Earth, maybe because 
some human from earth visited and confused him. This means that [8] would only be true for the 
doppelganger’s community. What the doppelganger intends to refer to is still is a matter of his 
mind. Now, if Putnam cannot tell the difference between elms and oaks, then there’s no content 
to the concepts except for the individuating principle. This doesn’t really matter either though. 
The community would disagree with the doppelganger’s use of the term “elm”, but what he 
intends it to refer to each time he uses it, is still a matter of his mind, even if it’s just any tree. 
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What people around him think he’s referring to, because of how they use the term, is a matter of 
their minds.  
Let’s say that in the example I just gave the doppelganger can tell the difference between 
beeches and oaks, in the same way that Putnam can tell the difference between elms and oaks, 
except that for the doppelganger the sensory contents he uses pertain to beeches. He intended to 
refer to what we call beeches when he (because of a lack of the sensory content that Putnam has 
about what we call elms) said (correctly in our opinion but falsely in the Twin Earth opinion), 
“That’s an elm”. This would mean there's a difference in his psychological state from Putnam’s, 
and [7] is not true because Putnam’s psychological state is that he intends to refer to a tree with 
the sensory content of elms. In this case [8] is true, but the reason why is still a matter of each 
person’s psychological state.  
That discussion was rather technical, but when understood it affirms that one’s 
community and causal relations to an object affect how we describe, and how we determine what 
are, the objects of our thoughts. What Putnam has said thus far is arguing that what a concept 
means is not determined by what we intend, but that’s only true if we define “meaning” without 
ever thinking about the subjective aspect of meaning! Thus far, the ideas that we do not have 
immediate and privileged knowledge of our thoughts, or that our thoughts do not have the non-
dispositional intentionality that they seem to have, is not established at all.  
Putnam goes on in the section to say that having a concept is not a matter of having images:  
A man may have all the images you please and still be completely at a loss when one says 
to him 'point to a tree'...He may even have the image of what he is supposed to do...acting 
in accordance with a picture is itself an ability one may or may not have...no matter what 
sort of inner phenomena we allow as possible expressions of thought...it is not the 
phenomena themselves that constitute understanding, but rather the ability of the thinker 
to...produce the right phenomena in the right circumstances” (398).  
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This is where things become very entangled. I will quote Putnam one last time and state why 
these examples do not help establish his conclusion either:  
…a man pretending to think in Japanese (and deceiving a Japanese telepath)...shows the 
futility of a phenomenological approach to the problem of understanding...On the other 
hand, consider the...possible man who does not have any 'interior monologue' at all. He 
speaks perfectly good English, and if asked what his opinions are... he will give them at 
length. But he never thinks...when he is not speaking out loud...[rather] he hears his own 
voice speaking...and has...a general 'feeling of understanding'...No one would hesitate to 
say that he was conscious...just because he did not think conscious thoughts except when 
speaking out loud. What follows...is that (a) no set of mental events-images or more 
'abstract' mental happenings and qualities-constitutes understanding; and (b) no set of 
mental events is necessary for understanding. In particular, concepts cannot be identical 
with mental objects of any kind. For...we have just seen that whatever it (a concept) is, it 
may be absent in a man who does understand the appropriate word, and present in a man 
who does not have the concept at all (399).  
Here's my critique. The first quote only establishes that if we want to say someone 
understands a concept, they should be able to produce the right kind of sentences and actions in 
response to, or accordance with, that concept. This does not mean that if we have a thought of 
the image of a tree without knowing what the concept “tree” is (like the man in Putnam’s 
example), that our thought is not about that image. So, the thought's intentionality has not been 
broken down. The only thing that is established is how we as third-person observers, should 
judge whether someone else understands a concept.  
The second quote, re-establishes the first quote's point with a very objectionable scenario. 
I would agree that if a man produces all the right behavior, and has conscious thoughts only 
when speaking out loud, that he can be said to understand. I agree because he still has conscious 
intentional thoughts about the concepts he is employing, even if only when he talks. If however, 
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even when speaking, he has no mental events corresponding to his verbal expressions, I think 
everyone should hesitate to say that he was conscious, or that he understood, because he could 
simply be a sophisticated machine.  
My final thought, and really the whole point of my critique, is that Putnam's claim that 
“concepts cannot be identical with mental objects of any kind” only makes sense if we accept 
that 1) someone who has never had a thought could be said to “understand” anything, but his 
examples are not convincing, and 2) that someone could have a “feeling of understanding” a 
concept without having an intentional thought about that concept. The only reasons to accept 
either of these ideas seem prima facie, like the fact that they help to get rid of the irreducible 
intentionality of thoughts.  
Functionalism, Fred Dretske, and Moths  
 Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, and a host of others now operate with a view of the mind as 
computational. Thus, intentionality is to consist of being related to physically realized 
representations in one’s mind, and thought processes are “transformations of mental 
representations” (Madell, Mind 26). However, this will not explain how a thought can be about 
something if the thought itself is a physical thing. Again, no physical thing can intrinsically be 
about another physical thing, it can only be about something to a thinker. If we say that this 
aboutness arises from the ability of a thought to be used in a certain way (dispositional analysis), 
whether internally or in behavior, my immediate self-knowledge of my own beliefs or other 
mental states is complicated by the fact that I will probably not manifest this disposition in many 
cases, but I am still “in” the mental state.12  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Madell puts the last example more poignantly by reminding us that we often “entertain an idle thought 
(27).”  
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 Madell keenly points out that “mental representations are the contemporary physical 
analogues of empiricist images (29)” He re-iterates “Hume’s Problem”: no manner of linkage 
between images will give you a thinking subject, or thought. This is as true for the idea of 
representations as it was for the “images” of old empiricism. Representations do not have any 
aboutness in and of themselves. Fodor and Dennett have expressed that tying these 
representations together via some “computational” or “inferential” process will dissolve the 
problem. This is not true. No matter how you construe it, the inferential process from one 
representation to another “cannot be from one thought to another” because a representation in 
itself is not a thought (29)! What this does is, again, make one of our most basic experiences, that 
of self knowledge, impossible, because I know what I am thinking of before any process of 
inference to other thoughts or beliefs is made (29). 
But, let’s not be hasty. One lengthy attempt to take representations and construct an 
acceptable account of intentionality, specifically of belief, is undertaken by Dretske. Dretske 
relies heavily on the idea of indication. Where Dretske and other physicalists often go wrong, is 
the jump from indicator content to belief content.  
Dretske gives three criteria for a representation to be a belief: 
1. The representation must be a part of a representational system that has the purpose of 
indicating what it does. This makes an indication a representation. A thermometer 
represents the surrounding temperature, though many other things about the environment 
could be calculated by the reading on the thermometer, none of which would be a 
representation because none are part of what the thermometer is meant to indicate 
(Plantinga, Content 19).  
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2. The structure C whose function it is to indicate x, has belief content “only if C causes 
some motor output or movement M, and the explanation of C’s causing M is C’s carrying 
the information that it” (19). Dretske uses the example of a moth that upon having certain 
brain processes indicate the presence of bats starts to “execute evasive maneuvers” (19). 
Dretske does not count the moth’s indicators of the presence of bats as beliefs that bats 
are presence because it is not in virtue of their information that the moth is evading the 
bats, but rather it is simply a matter of mechanism, or “the moth’s genes (20).” Thus the 
third criterion.  
3. There must be some process of learning for the representation to be a belief. Typically, 
learning will also help to reduce possibilities of further action. Imagine a bird that gets to 
peck at a choice of three colored spots on a wall, which continually change positions, and 
every time it pecks the red spot it is rewarded with food. Eventually, it will only poke the 
red spot and the bird can then be said to believe or proto-believe that there’s a red spot in 
front of it (20).  
 
Now, for one, this account cannot accommodate necessary beliefs like 7+5=12. It is difficult 
to put this point more succinctly than Plantinga. “An indicator co varies with what it indicates; 
when it occurs, what it indicates also occurs (or probably occurs). 7+5’s equaling 12, however, 
always obtains; hence no-thing co varies with it; hence nothing indicates it (Content and Natural 
Selection 21).” This same problem arises when we talk about historical facts, which are 
“accidentally necessary” (Plantinga, Materialism 140). 
The more serious objections are virtually the same however. First, criterion #2 is too strong. 
We can see that no motor output is necessary for me to have a belief. As Madell says “..if my 
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thinking of something is a matter of my being disposed to behave in some way, it must follow 
that I can have no idea what it is I am thinking of until this behavioral disposition is 
manifested…” (Mind and Mat. 12).  
Most importantly, Dretske’s criteria side step the more fundamental issue: how the bird (in 
criterion three) would gain the belief  “the red spot will give me food”, or whatever it is, and the 
intentionality of that belief, from the mental representations. Take the example of a thermometer 
that’s designed to turn on a furnace when it goes below 67 degrees F. When it goes below this 
temperature it fulfills criteria 1 and 2. The only difference between this thermometer and the bird 
is the third criterion. But the third criterion sheds no light on the intentionality of the state being 
ascribed to the bird. Before the bird consistently pecks at the red spot it seems like we’re 
supposed to think that the bird is mechanistically pecking at random spots on the wall, until, 
somehow, the fact that its body is being nourished when it pecks at the red spot transforms the 
representation of a red spot (which up until now has simply been part of a functional process 
causing motor output) into a belief about the red spot. I think that upon looking at the initial 
problem, this transformation is completely misleading. The representation was never a belief, 
neither could the fact that it is beneficial to the bird’s health to peck at the red spot cause the 
representation of the red spot to all of a sudden attain the intentionality needed for it to become a 
belief about the red spot.  
Another way of looking at this problem would be to picture the moth’s indicators (in 
criterion two) as being designed (say by God, or humans via some future advancement in 
science) to indicate the presence of bats and cause the output of evasive maneuvers (Plantinga, 
Materialism 140). These indications are representations. The only thing missing from the moth is 
this process of learning. But we could imagine the moth trying several different patterns of 
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evasive maneuvers on several different occasions. Each time, it gets bumped by a bat and suffers 
just-so-slight disorientation. Finally, the moth tries a maneuver that prevents its being bumped. 
Henceforth, it employs these specific maneuvers when the bat-representations are present. Does 
this in any way show that now the neural representations for a bat being present are beliefs? It 
seems obvious that nothing with respect to the actual representations has changed; their nature is 
the same. The physical states still are not about anything. Dretske’s claim that learning 
transforms these representations into beliefs is almost arbitrary.  
Finally, we can re-construct the whole scenario by simply attributing beliefs to the bird the 
whole time, as a basic activity it engages in as a conscious, immaterial mind, and say simply that 
its wrong beliefs (that if it hits one of the spots it will go away, that if it hits the spots hard 
enough food will come, if it hits all the spots food will come) are experientially ruled out, not 
that it has no beliefs about the spots during this process and suddenly it possesses this singular 
belief that the red spot will give it food. Or, we could opt to not attribute beliefs to the bird at all. 
The central point of all this is that indicator content does not equal belief content, Dretske’s 
dispositional account of representations cannot explain the intentionality of a thought (it could 
blatantly deny it), and only a subject already capable of thought can see a representation as about 
something.  
Kim’s Close and Dennett’s Dodging 
Moving forward, Jaegwon Kim, another renowned physicalist, in defense of some kind of 
functional account of intentionality says “…it seems to me inconceivable that a possible world 
exists that is an exact physical duplicate of this world but lacking wholly in intentionality (qtd. in 
Madell, The Road 1).” A dualist will agree with this if what Kim means is that a world 
duplicating ours physically will probably not lack intentionality (though I would not say it is 
inconceivable), because many features of our world only make sense if there are creatures with 
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immaterial minds capable of intentional thoughts in them. But if Kim means that we can picture 
a duplicate world first, remove the source of intentional states (immaterial minds), and then still 
expect there to be intentionality, the dualist would object. In principle though, there is agreement 
with what Kim has literally said, since many of the physical characteristics of the world are 
brought to be through intentionality on behalf of thinkers.  
In his most recent work, Physicalism or Something Near Enough, Kim has argued that all 
of a person’s mental life can be reduced, except for qualia. This is surely an over-statement. Kim 
thinks that we will eventually be given a satisfying materialistic account of things like belief, 
desire, and the intentionality of thought in general, but explicitly says “it is ‘perhaps unlikely that 
we will have such definitions any time soon’ ”(qtd. in Madell, The Road 2). In case someone 
should miss this. Kim has just said there is no satisfying materialistic account of beliefs; none, 
zip, zero. Yet, the state of affairs in philosophy of mind seems to imply that this isn’t a point 
physicalists have to deal with any longer. Many place faith in the “eventual” release of a 
satisfying account. 
Here is the gist of another, similar, appeal by Kim in defense of the potential for a 
functionalist account: “Consider a population of creatures … that are functionally and 
behaviorally indistinguishable from us … If all this is the case, it would be incoherent to 
withhold states like belief, desire, knowledge, action and intention from these creatures” (qtd. in 
Madell, The Road 2).	  
Presumably Kim means to say that if there are a population of creatures that are 
functionally and behaviorally indistinguishable from us, and do not have immaterial minds, we 
should still attribute thought life to them. But, just judging what he says, a dualist can agree, 
because this is how a dualist would think that we generally go about judging whether someone 
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has these states anyway. Except, a dualist would also say that we do so on the basis of first-
person awareness of our own intentional thought-life and resulting behavior (2). Madell correctly 
states that there would be two options for Kim to take with regards to what the functional re-
definitions we await would do to intentionality. One is to say that these re-definitions eliminate 
the non-dispositional property of thought, and that comes with the plethora of problems I’ve 
addressed with respect to Dretske’s analysis, and others I’ll bring up with regards to eliminative 
materialism’s stance on this issue; the other option is to say that the redefinitions will leave this 
feature as it is, an irreducible facet of human experience, in which case the materialist enterprise 
should be considered a failure.  
Philosopher Daniel Dennett has also offered what he takes to be an analysis of the 
intentionality in our mental life via his notion of “the intentional stance.” There are two aspects 
to this analysis. First, Dennett says that people ascribe intentional states, like “belief,” “desire” 
etc. to others’ behavior as a predictive strategy; when interpreting behavior this way, one is 
taking the intentional stance (Dennett, 15). This schema is extremely successful. It is in virtue of 
this predictive strategy that, in practice, we come to find out about the second aspect, which is 
that intentional states are real, because they pick out certain real patterns in the world. These 
patterns are not physical but rather “intellectual” patterns. He gives the example of a Martian 
looking on at the stock market and, having a complete knowledge of the physical forces at work, 
is able to predict everything that happens, but, because it does not take the intentional stance it 
misses “a real pattern”, namely the real pattern of intentional behavior exhibited by the people 
involved in the market. There are three problems here, the first two of which are related, and 
Dennett, though acknowledging them, doesn’t really meet the issues. The third, more severe 
problem, he completely ignores, like many physicalists have seemed to do.  
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The first problem is that a physicalist should simply go the route of saying that the 
Martian would see the intellectual patterns, but see them for what they really are: some pattern 
(even if broad) of neurophysiology, or elementary particles, and thus beliefs as we conceive of 
them would be eliminated. The second problem is that our prospects of ever discerning such a 
physical pattern are almost hopeless; for the dualist, and even some physicalists, this is 
completely impossible because there are no token physical events that indicate, say, anger, in 
themselves, it is simply by virtue of our own experience (i.e. our own intentional mental life) that 
we take certain actions as being expressive of anger. Further, a dualist would out rightly deny 
that any being having complete knowledge of the physical world, but no knowledge of human’s 
intentional mental lives, could make consistently accurate predictions of the stock market. 
Like I said, Dennett answers this challenge indirectly. In a later essay he describes a frog 
and our characterization of the frog’s actions in terms of intentional stances, like the frog’s 
“belief that you are behind him” or “desire to escape” when it jumps away from us, as useful to 
an extent, but not the full truth (Dennett, 109). Dennett claims eliminativism would be right in 
saying that this description can be reduced to neurophysiology, but he also claims that 
eliminativists are missing some kind of real thing when eliminating the reality of thoughts and 
these intentional states altogether. He stays away from ontological problems of his position by 
claiming that he thinks beliefs are as real as the equator, or the gravitational center of an object. 
He seems to think that because there is dispute about the ontological status of these things (are 
they physical realities?), but their existence does not threaten materialism, that there’s an equal 
ambiguity with the ontological status of beliefs that does not threaten materialism.  
Let’s just deflate this. The reality of the equator is obvious in one form or another, even if 
only as a “real” conceptual tool. If it is physical, you can give a physical description of the 
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equator at any given moment, even if the atoms that make it up are not consistent13. The reality 
of thought is obvious in one form or another also. But are they, as a physicalist should believe, 
physical realities? We should not be satisfied by a philosopher’s claim that “the equator’s 
ontological status is mysterious” when there are ways to respond to the question and defenses of 
different sides available. Neither should we allow Dennett to simply write off beliefs as being 
“real” physical patterns but not explain how these patterns avoid complete reduction. This leads 
us to the third and fourth problems with Dennett’s line of thought here. 
Dennett does not give a satisfactory answer (any at all?) to the question of what it would 
mean for a physical thing to be a belief or for any physical set-up to produce the intentionality 
present in thoughts. Surely, my having a belief does not mean necessarily that someone uses this 
intentional strategy to interpret my behavior and ascribe to me the state of having a certain belief. 
That would sound like the idea of holistic interpretation, which, though true to an extent, 
overreaches its explanatory scope and makes my demonstrable experience of self-knowledge 
impossible. There are times I entertain a belief and no one has any idea, no one interprets my 
behavior, and I am not disposed to act in any way because of this belief (like my belief that if I 
had had the ability to type faster when I started this thesis I would have had much more written 
about Dennett’s position by now. I’m not going to go take a typing class, and…)  
Along these lines, Dennett simply writes off the reality of self-knowledge (in the sense of 
a private knowledge of one’s own mental states) with a possibility, the possibility that we are 
conflating the intentional stance of propositions with some more basic neuro-physiological thing 
(which could either be defined reductively or functionally I suppose, either one of which has 
received no plausible account yet) which is actually belief (Dennett, 115). He returns to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I personally think that the equator is better seen as a conceptual tool, a real idea, not a physical entity.  
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example of the frog by saying that it’s useful to characterize the frog’s behavior, as well as 
human behavior, as intentional, but that “In both cases behavior is controlled by a complex 
internal state “ (115). The difference is that with humans, language helps to give an illusion of 
individuation for specific beliefs, through expressions, internal to the subject or made public, but 
this could simply be “an artifact of the environmental demand for a particular sort of act” (114). 
This also can be dealt with pretty swiftly. Dennett cannot simply assert that the reason 
beliefs seem to be equivalent to propositions is that we do not yet know the complex internal 
states that actually produce them. The reason it’s easy for him to do this is that he is addressing 
himself to other physicalists like Fodor who want to picture some sort of “Mentalese” language14 
that is behind our propositional attitudes in a broadly organized set of correlations. This more 
basic mental language, Dennett correctly points out, need not be arranged in the same way 
propositional content comes to be arranged. But this doesn’t matter to the dualist objection, one 
that everyone should see for what it is. Should Dennett be asked to explain the fundamental 
objection, what any of these physically describable internal states that are beliefs and thoughts, 
along with their intrinsic intentionality, are themselves, or how intentionality could arise from 
such physical states, or how to explain the reality of self-knowledge, we can expect no answer.  
Why Try Eliminativism? 
Stich and Churchland Answer 
Up to this point, I have argued that physicalists can give no account of intentional mental 
states without unacceptable consequences. There are some thinkers who have seen this difficulty 
and have taken what may be the most natural turn. Their move is to claim that all concepts 
associated with these mental states constitute a theory of human behavior that is completely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Which will have to be instantiated by, if not equivalent to, some token physical set-up, and how any 
physical state could give rise to a belief along with its intrinsic aboutness, or how such Mentalese 
statements could ever become a proposition, I still have no idea.  
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false. The common term to label this theory is “folk psychology”. I will call it “commonsense 
psychology” (CP hereafter), since it’s obvious that the term “folk” is meant to carry negative 
connotation. Anyway, the claim is that there is no need for reduction because these concepts, 
such as beliefs and desires, have no application to anything in the real world. What needs to be 
done is eliminate these concepts from our talk about humans.  
There are many considerations that lead philosophers to think that we must eliminate 
intentional concepts. The first two that I mention can be found in the writings of Stephen Stich 
(Madell, Mind 64). 
First, since science is concerned only with causally relevant features of the world, and the 
content of propositional attitudes is determined by invoking factors which are causally irrelevant 
(we saw this earlier in the case of how the linguistic community one is a part of may determine 
what one means by a term), it follows that in explaining behavior we should not invoke these 
attitudes, and further, that such intentional states do not exist (64).  
The second consideration is tied to the first.  It is that folk psychology wrongly describes 
intentional states as reasons for which humans behave as they do to (Taliaferro 73).  An example 
drawn from social psychology involves a group of insomniacs who “are given placebo pills 
which they are told will have certain effects. When the effects happen as predicted…and the 
subjects are informed that the pills were in fact placebos, the subjects tend to invent reasons for 
their behavior that are more respectable” (73). The insomniac experiment is frequently cited, so 
it will be good to describe some of the details to explain the supposed problem. 
One group of insomniacs was given placebos and told that the pill would cause a 
multitude of symptoms, all of which are normal symptoms for any insomniac; this was the 
“arousal group”. The other group was told the placebos were supposed to facilitate sleep, 
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basically cause all the regular symptoms of insomnia to stop; this was the “relaxation group” 
(Horgan 206, 207). The researchers predicted that the placebos would cause particular effects 
described in attribution theory15 to kick in and produce certain behavior. Specifically, the arousal 
group would fall asleep faster, writing off all their normal symptoms to being effects of the 
placebo, and the relaxation group would take longer to fall asleep, being worried about their 
normal symptoms not going away (Horgan 207). The predictions had overwhelming success. 
However, the subjects, when asked for what they thought were the reasons for their behavior, 
blatantly denied that the placebos had any affect and gave other reasons like “they usually found 
it easier to get to sleep later in the week”. Thus, because many other experiments generate 
similar results, Stich argues that the mechanisms that actually produce behavior could be 
completely separate from those that produce linguistic behavior and the expression of 
propositional attitudes. (Horgan 206, 207). If that’s the case then, in tandem with the charge that 
we interpret others’ mental states using other causally irrelevant features, a central reason for 
maintaining the reality of CP, causal efficacy, is lost and CP seems like deadweight. Stich’s 
examples, though interesting, do not lend as much weight his prescribed solution  as may seem. 
A dualist need not maintain that humans are not subject to self-deception. As Taliaferro points 
out, the experiments can easily be accommodated into a folk-psychology model of explanation in 
that the subjects invented such reasons because they had “still other beliefs and desires about 
what they found embarrassing and appealing” (74).16 
Taking Stich’s first mentioned point in isolation, even if I invoke factors external to a 
person in characterizing their mental state, the fact that they have a mental state is a matter of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15“A theory of attribution is a theory of how ordinary people assign causes to events such as behaviors 
and mental states (understood broadly to include character traits) (Ravenscroft).” 
16 A further response will be made below. 
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their experience. Stich is making a suggestion akin to the idea of holistic interpretation and 
Putnam’s externalism, simply in different colors, and the point it’s supposed to implicate still 
seems unwarranted. Though determining the content of a belief is influenced by the specifics of 
our linguistic communities, this does nothing to sway our security in the legitimacy of explaining 
many of a person’s actions by their beliefs. Say someone believes “My lips are dry”, and “This 
chap-stick will hydrate my lips”, their subsequent behavior of applying the chap-stick to their 
lips could properly be said to be caused by those beliefs. By itself then, the consideration at hand 
gives little reason against the supposition that there are an abundance of situations where 
intentional states are causally efficacious, still less does it validate the eliminative move. This 
relates to a third consideration in favor of eliminativism. To see how, another example by Stitch 
will be helpful. Madell cites it as follows:  
 
Can we say, of the Russian soldier who suffered severe brain-damage in the Second 
World War which seriously impaired his conceptual network, that he believes that the 
pencil is made of wood, even though he can say nothing further about what wood 
is…Does the increasingly senile Mrs. T, who tells us every so often that ‘President 
McKinley was assassinated’, really believe this when she can tell us absolutely nothing 
else about the event? (Mind 65).  
 
Because of such cases, it seems as though our interpreting of intentional states not only 
invokes causally irrelevant features, it’s unreliable and rests on shaky ground. This translates into 
an eliminativist attitude by being combined with the factors just mentioned, like giving weight to 
the idea that intentional states are merely conventions employed by humans in interpreting 
behavior amongst each other, and nothing else. But, first, the case above is obviously not normal, 
our ability to ascribe beliefs is usually not so tenuous. Second, echoing an earlier response to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  39	  	  
Dennett’s intentional stance, the intended picture leaves us without a clue as to where such an 
interpretation of behavior would ever have gotten started. If “mental kinds have a purely nominal 
essence”, and some individual did not first robustly experience and realize a belief as being a 
belief, before anyone interpreted it, and before seeing the action to be taken because of the belief, 
the whole enterprise of CP becomes a historical absurdity (66). 
One more consideration for taking the eliminativist position is put forward by Dennett 
and takes its cue from B.F. Skinner’s view that the postulating of “little homunculi” (what a 
dualist may say is an immaterial mind) to account for consciousness generally, and thus the 
intentional states in conscious experience, needs to be explained itself. So, Dennett maintains a 
pseudo-eliminativism in that though intentional concepts can be retained in psychology, we 
should strive to explain these homunculi by more, “dumber” homunculi, and continue breaking 
down the intentionality of what appears to be one subject until we have an explanation of the 
physical sciences (the homunculi become say, cells) (Taliaferro 35). One rejoinder must be kept 
in mind. How such an assembly of unintentional objects can constitute an intentional state is a 
phenomenon that needs explanation also, and why we ever started to categorize these “armies of 
idiots” as Dennett calls them, as “my belief that x”, is absent from the entire conversation. 
Dennett is setting up a model for explanation that requires reduction to physical elements.  
This is obviously not a serious threat, there will always be a point of explanation that 
cannot be “gotten past”; the charge of an electron provides a simple example from physics itself 
(Plantinga, Materialism 117). In the investigation of any natural phenomena, the push for a 
“deeper level” explanation will eventually come to an end. For our mental life, the end comes 
abruptly. Intentional states are non-dispositional and cannot be further analyzed to fit into any 
materialist explanation.   
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Taking up the more important considerations, we can now ask what the influential 
philosophers Paul and Patricia Churchland mean by their assertion that the intentional concepts  
(Churchland)we use in describing our mental life are nothing more than “a theory about human 
behavior”. First, there is the relevant structure to which Paul Churchland points. Theories tend to 
make possible generalizations about the relevant domain. Take the following generalization from 
physics: for any body (y), there is a force which equals the mass of (y) multiplied by the 
acceleration of (y), or f=m x a. Churchland construes our ideas of beliefs and their resulting 
behavior in the same way: If x fears that p, x will desire that not p, He gives more complicated 
examples but one can see the point quickly (Churchland 71). Jose Bermudez sums up 
Churchland’s picture of CP as “A particular conceptual framework for explaining social 
understanding and social coordination in which the propositional attitudes are central” 
(Bermudez 38). For now, we will keep taking it for granted that CP is a theory. States like 
beliefs, desires, etc., are simply explanatory tools. We’ll sketch some of the reasons why 
Churchland and others think it must be scrapped in toto.  
An over-arching charge against CP is that it hasn’t progressed or afforded advances in 
understanding the things it is supposed to explain. Churchland states that our current 
understanding of how people act based on the propositional attitudes, is essentially unchanged 
from the time of Greek antiquity (Churchland 74). Further, there are a plethora of phenomena for 
which CP affords no explanation. Churchland cites “the nature and dynamics of mental illness, 
the faculty of creative imagination…the nature and psychological functions of sleep…the 
common ability to catch an outfield fly ball on the run…the miracle of memory…the nature of 
the learning process itself” (73). CP apparently gives us no way of understanding these processes 
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that (some more obviously than others) fall under the range of “mental”. For any theory to fail on 
such a large scale deems it highly suspect.  
Another broad charge is the fact that CP is not in sync with our maturing theories in the 
physical materialistic sciences. “In short, the greatest theoretical synthesis in the history of the 
human race is currently in our hands…But FP is no part of this growing synthesis” (75). CP does 
not seem reducible to any other field of scientific enquiry. Churchland even develops at length an 
analogy comparing the functionalist attempt to retain CP to an alchemist’s attempt to retain “vital 
spirits” in the field of organic chemistry (81).17 For Churchland, this charge combines with the 
earlier one to form a strong case that CP is completely false in its characterizations of human 
cognition, and should be discarded.  
In brief response to these first two claims, CP is not supposed to explain the phenomenon 
of sleep and its benefits to mental health, or the catching of a fly ball, at least not the mechanics 
of it.18 Also, there can be a case made for the progression of CP in our understanding of many 
other phenomena, pace Churchland’s claim. Terence Horgan cites Neuropsychologist Richard 
Gregory’s account of visual perception as “employing concepts recognizably like the folk-
psychological concepts” (Horgan 200). 
Another example of progression in CP returns to the experiments in which insomniacs 
are given placebo pills and their explanation as to the causes of their behaviors do not mesh with 
what the researchers deems to be the causes. The insomniacs perhaps were not aware of the 
beliefs that in fact caused their facility or lack of sleep, but this does not mean that their beliefs 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Since functionalists are largely physicalists, I do not have a large stake in answering this attack.  It 
only serves to move us into a position to assess what I think is the only consistent move for a 
physicalist, eliminativism.  
18 I could say that the reason the outfielder is there in the first place, and is going to risk injury to catch 
the ball, is that he believes he can make it to the major leagues. A couple years down the road, when 
playing outside of the competitive arena, he may not dive towards the fence, because this belief is no 
longer undergirding his play. 
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were not efficacious in producing these effects. In fact, Stich characterizes the experiment as one 
in which such factors are at work: “attribution theory…predicts that subjects in the relaxation 
group s…will infer that their emotionally laden thoughts must be particularly disturbing to them. 
And this belief will upset them further..” (qtd. in Horgan 209). This now popular idea of 
“unconscious” beliefs and desires are dramatic updates in CP (207). 
Anyhow, these are responses to a priori parameters on what CP is meant to explain, and, 
the “history of science is full of examples in which our pre-theoretical expectations…turned out 
to be quite misleading. For example, the demand…on optical theories that they account for 
facts…having to do with the physiology or psychology of vision” (200). Similar to Dennett’s 
explanatory requirements, this strategy is not very persuasive. CP does find support in countless 
day-to-day activities. To point to a class of phenomena that it does not explain, but that no one 
expects it to explain, cannot be seriously expected to throw large doubts on the existence of the 
states postulated.  
A few more objections before moving on; CP is used to identify causes, not form “new 
causal generalizations”, though it indeed can do so. Historians explain almost exclusively by 
employing CP, it is ideographic as opposed to most sciences, which are nomothetic. That CP 
hasn’t changed much is also expected if many parts of it are in fact correct. Further, to put it 
bluntly, arguments relying on the disdain of pre-modern-era concepts seem to be pretty 
gratuitous in the epistemic weight they give to factors which don’t really imply their desired 
conclusions anyway.19 Finally, to really render the second broad charge (“CP does not seem 
reducible…”) inefficacious we can imagine that, if it is as serious of a matter as Churchland 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 like some unimpressive arguments against the existence of God. “People thousands of years ago 
believed in God, (fill in a bunch of irrelevant empirical facts here), obviously God is a vestige of an 
unsophisticated mode of human thought.”   
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claims it is, it would in essence constitute an argument against the existence of God. God is a 
being whose properties no natural science could hope to reduce, therefore…20. 
 
Why Abandon Eliminativism? 
Boghossian on Content 
Philosopher Paul Boghossian, in his essay “The Status of Content”, calls all the 
considerations for eliminativism that I responded to in the last section “toothless”. He further 
contends that the arguments that are important for eliminativism share a dangerous feature. 
Though they are targeted at mental content, they make no reference to the “bearers” of content 
properties, just the properties, and thus they could be used to argue against the existence 
linguistic content in general (Boghossian 17). In other words, they are arguments against the idea 
of linguistic meaning, period.  
He lists four kinds of arguments for eliminativism, which we have encountered in 
differing forms in the previous sections: arguments from the indeterminacy of content 
(apparently stemming from Quine but also referred to by Stich), the holistic character of content 
(owing to Davidson but employed by Stich also), the irreducibility of content (just spoken of by 
Churchland) and the “queerness” of content (“advocated recently by Kripke's Wittgenstein”) 
(17).21 To the benefit of content skeptics (in that it enables the arguments to apply in broader 
circumstances), and in sync with what may be the popular conception of content anyway, 
Boghossian assumes “that contents just are truth conditions.” This just means that what a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 I have taken up this method of informal reductio from several of Plantinga’s essays. The relevance for 
this essay is seen more sharply when we take into account that sometimes explanations claim that God 
has acted in the world. Problems like conservation of energy and causation need to be addressed of 
course, and dualism must answer them also. This will be taken up later.  
21 “advocated recently by Kripke's Wittgenstein” It also is similar to considerations we’ve seen: “…no 
real property could have the sorts of features that common sense considers constitutive of content”. I 
suppose being put into the relevant relationships of propositional logic would be an example of such a 
“queer feature”. 
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sentence says about the world, are its contents, and those contents determine whether the 
sentence is true (i.e. if what it says about the world obtains in the world, it is true). 
So, these arguments implicate irrealism22 towards truth-conditions.  
There are different kinds of irrealism, but for eliminative materialism the relevant kind is an 
“error conception” of content. An error conception towards a region of discourse with predicates 
and statements involving those predicates, call the region of discourse “F”, says that though the 
sentences in F are declarative, (i.e. the predicates denote possibly real properties), nothing 
actually has those properties, and thus all of F’s assertions are false (4). Say the property P is a 
part of “F” (CP for our purposes), an error theory with respect to P can be summarized: “ ‘x is P’ 
is always false”(12). Two things are implicated in an error thesis. First, “x is P” possesses truth 
conditions.23 This obviously must be the case for the statement to be regarded as false. Secondly, 
this means that for all error theories there is a presupposition “…that the target sentences possess 
truth conditions (19).” 
But, with the aforementioned conflation of content and truth conditions in mind, an error 
conception of content is claiming that: “…All sentences of the form ‘S has truth condition p’ are 
false, where S is to be understood as ranging over sentences in the language of thought, or neural 
structures, as well as over public-language sentences” (174). Plugging in an example relevant to 
CP would go something like this:  
 
The following sentence is always false: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Boghossian uses this term throughout and gives a definition: “An Irrealist conception of a given region 
of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in 
question” (2). 
23 Boghossian’s argument is flexible, what truth conditions are can be “on whatever construal of truth is 
favored.” His essay describes robust and deflationary views, in the case of error theories, both are 
viable, neither salvages the theory. 
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“ ‘Mike believes that the horse is black’ (S) has as its content (or as its the truth condition) ‘the 
horse is black’ (p)”. 
 
Returning to the general claim of the error conception of content, the problem is inescapable. 
The error conception of content “implies both that truth-condition-attributing sentences have 
truth conditions” (because “S has truth conditions p” cannot be false unless it has truth 
conditions) “and that they don’t have them” (because if “for no S and for no p does S have truth 
condition p”, then the sentence “S has truth conditions P” cannot have truth conditions). So, the 
error conception of content, the eliminativist’s best way to formulate skepticism towards the 
reality propositional attitudes (and thus their intentionality) is self-contradictory. 
Microfeatures, Social Psychology, and Insensitive Seminary Students: 
Alternative Motivations for Eliminativism 
Jose Bermudez recognizes the problem Boghossian poses for the eliminativist’s usual 
attack on CP’s propositional attitudes (to remind us, these are the intentional states of believing, 
desiring, fearing, etc., that x). If the arguments are employable against content in general, they 
result in a contradiction. Bermudez thinks that the method of arguing must take on different 
form, consisting in two steps. First is the now familiar strategy of reducing the explanatory scope 
of CP, thus weakening the popular idea that CP is really as useful as some deem it to be. But 
moving beyond this, the second step for Bermudez is to point out the “fundamental mismatch 
between…the model of representation implicated in…CP…and the family of models of 
representation that…provide the best general picture of how the brain can be representational” 
(Bermudez 36).24 In reducing the explanatory scope of CP, Bermudez addresses two questions:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 I argued earlier that what it means for a brain-state to be a linguistic representation, a belief, is not at all 
clear. Here we say a point of agreement for between the dualist and eliminativist. Instead however, 
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(1) Does successful social behavior always require explaining and/or predicting the 
behavior of other participants? 
(2) In those cases where social behavior does depend on explaining and predicting the 
behavior of others, do such explanations and predictions have to involve propositional 
attitude psychology? (Bermudez 42)    
To address (1) we are given several examples. He cites, from game-theorists, the 
prisoner’s dilemma. Basically, the situation is that if prisoners A & B betray each other they each 
get five more years in prison. If one does, but the other doesn’t, the one who did will be freed, 
the other will stay another ten years. If both keep silent, they will only stay two years. The 
“dominant strategy”, the one that reaps the best results without considering the other’s choice, is 
to betray. But if both prisoners kept silent, it would fare better for both of them (42). The moral 
of this whole picture is supposed to be that using the “dominant strategy” one can make a 
decision, and one doesn’t really need to know what the other person will do. You don’t have to 
try and predict their behavior, and thus you do not have to employ CP at all (43). 
In on-going social interactions which are essentially “iterated” prisoner’s dilemmas, one 
may, instead of trying to predict the behavior of the other, assess what they’ve done in the past 
and base your own actions on those: 
The best known of these heuristic strategies is TIT-FOR TAT, which is composed of the 
following two rules: 
4. Always co-operate in the first round 
5. In any subsequent round do what your opponent did in the previous round.   
(Bermudez, 44) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
they’re arguing for representations of an entirely different kind. But how this could make sense of our 
higher cognitive faculties seems less intelligible than the idea of reduction.  
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Again, the shift is from predicting the others behavior using CP, to deciding your own.  
A more pedestrian example, shifting to situations better categorized under (2) earlier, would be 
our interactions with a waiter. Such social interactions may seem to require that I predict the 
waiter’s behavior in terms of their beliefs or desires. But, contra this seemingly natural 
assumption, Bermudez submits:  
The social interaction takes care of itself once the social roles have been identified (and 
I’ve decided what I want to eat)…explanation and prediction need not require the 
attribution of propositional attitudes…We learn through experience that certain social 
cues are correlated with certain behavior patters on the part of others and certain 
expectations from those same individuals as to how we ourselves should behave. (45)  
The weaknesses in these general arguments are easy to see. For the most part, we 
severely doubt that many real-life situations arise are clean-cut enough as these suggestions 
could be adapted to fit. Take the prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoners obviously know each other 
by name at least. To be able to betray the other means that there has been some amount of shared 
experience. Are we to think that neither of the prisoners would even attempt to sketch what the 
other’s character and beliefs are and base their decision at least in tandem with those 
considerations? I recognize that the model is just a model, but does it pose any serious threat to 
CP? 
Or take the description of a familiar social interaction with a waitress. How do we 
understand what it is for another to “expect us to behave” a certain way? The waitress is 
expecting us to order food when he comes to the table, is not this essentially the same as them 
believing that we will order food? Would we have any real understanding of the situation if we 
eliminated our thinking of them as having intentional states? I am basically appealing to our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  48	  	  
desire to explain. The fact “Waitresses take your order for food when you go to a restaurant.” 
would not explain why anyone is a waitress in the first place, or why this restaurant’s waitresses 
talk to you so much more politely, and without answer to that first question one would have to 
say that the whole situation would be rather absurd.25 
Moving on towards Bermudez’s second step and more novel suggestions, he points out 
first, that Paul Churchland sees cognition as resembling the processes in artificial neural 
networks (computational models of sorts) in which the brain’s representations of the world 
correspond to vectors involving large populations of neurons that are “pushed through” matrices 
to other vectors (other populations of neurons) and the result is an innumerable possibility of 
representations and processes (46). This “seeing” of Churchland is more properly a future 
expected discovery of neuroscience. Supposing that cognitive science produces a system in 
which these multi-dimensional representations are governed by laws, correlating them to each 
other and to the organism’s sensory and motor functions, the result would be that the components 
of the propositional attitudes (subjects, predicates etc.) could not correspond to these processes in 
any fashion because of the sheer complexity of such neural states and the lack of a satisfactory 
conceptual repertoire (48).26  
If we identified groups of neurons that carry “specific semantic or representational 
contents…” (again, I deny that this notion even makes sense), then they probably do so in virtue 
of each individual neuron’s specific activation levels, which represent microfeatures or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 An answer to that question could be, roughly, “Waitresses wait as a means to earn money, or because 
they thoroughly enjoy the job, or both.” This would yield implications for a waitresses’ beliefs about 
what the result of their waiting on you will be, both monetary and/or emotional satisfaction for them.  
26 It should be noted that physicalists themselves have been divided over whether this would actually be 
the case even if Churchland’s expectations are fulfilled (Horgan and Woodward). 
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subsymbolic feature of the environment.27 Bermudez goes on: “the crucial question is the 
relationship between this subsymbolic level of representation in terms of microfeatures and the 
symbolic level of representation in terms of object and properties (50).”  
The relevant issue is to identify a level of neural representation that serves as a more 
fundamental tool than CP to navigate our social interactions (53). For the sake of not ignoring 
the substance of his argument we can take a look at some of the examples.  
The first is tied to vision and movement. Bermudez describes the widely accepted idea of there 
being “two visual pathways ” (53). There is “vision for action” where visual stimuli are projected 
to the “posterior parietal cortex”, commonly inhibited in people with optic ataxia28, and “vision 
for identification” where visual stimuli are projected to the “inferotemporal cortex” and is 
commonly damaged in people with agnosia29. One experiment records that though a subject may 
perceive two circles to be different in size, when they reach out for them, they reach as though 
they are the same size. Thus, the property of “graspability” seems to be outside of the domain of 
CP, and is not responsible for the way the subjects act, because the subject’s belief that one circle 
is bigger than the other, does not correspond to the movements made (53). Other such examples 
identify sensory microfeatures that provide the explanation for certain behaviors that CP would 
misidentify, building a case for the mistaken application of CP to much of our behavior. 
A category with seemingly more direct implications is “The Influence of Situation in 
Social Psychology”. Factors like whether one has found a dime, ambient noise, whether one is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Perceptual content is not fully reducible to belief content, many of Bermudez’s examples will relate to 
that. Our perceptions outstrip our conceptual repertoire, some contend, and in the same way our 
“multidimensional neural representations” are not fully captured by the content of propositional 
attitudes. But, eliminativism goes farther, and says that the content of the propositional attitudes are 
misrepresentations, not partial ones (49). 
28 “Optic ataxia is characterized by an impaired visual control of the direction of arm reaching to a visual 
target, accompanied by defective hand orientation and grip formation” (oxford). 
29 “Loss of the ability to interpret sensory stimuli, such as sounds or images” (American Heritage 
Dictionary) 
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running late, have been found to play drastically heavy roles in determining behavior, and 
altruistic behavior in particular (60). One experiment, amusing or disheartening depending on 
your perspective, involved seminary students going to give talks and passing a man laying out on 
a stairwell groaning. The only consistent factor in whether they helped was whether they were 
told that they were late (%10) or if they had time to get there (63%). The relevance of these 
experiments is that they cast doubt on whether CP’s propositional attitudes really are the “springs 
of action” and whether situational microfeatures play a larger role, in-tandem with many other 
things like those perceptual microfeatures described above and others not explored by Bermudez.  
One must wonder, when it comes to social psychology, whether in fact large umbrellas of 
propositional attitudes can be cast, irrelevant of the subject’s “fundamental attribution error”30. 
These experiments should not surprise us much. If we believe that people are not generally 
selfless, these situations are in line with what we would cast as the CP beliefs undergirding all 
their interactions in the world. If we do not attribute robust altruistic character traits to many 
people, we will expect situational factors to heavily influence their decisions. If the seminary 
students believe they are going to be late, and they believe they could lose future opportunities if 
they stop, and they don’t really believe that say, God will honor their helping of a man groaning 
on the stairs, they probably won’t stop, because of those beliefs (and lack of a particular belief). 
How is this not an adequate explanation?   
Bermudez admits that the examples pertaining to mechanical action earlier do not suffice 
to displace CP in the realm of social interaction, and I have intimated that situationist social 
psychology does not militate against the existence of intentional states playing some underlying 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 This is basically the fact that people will give “nicer” reasons for their actions where the data obviously 
imply other reasons. Stich’s insomniacs are another case of this.  
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part to the results observed in their experiments. As it stands then, eliminative materialism has 
been stripped of the strength it has against CP that many have rhetorically given it.  
Our survey of a number of different attempts to analyze the non-dispositional nature of 
intentional states, or propositional attitudes, or whatever the preferred phrase may be, into 
functional states, into mere tools for interpretation, or into non-existence, has presented a myriad 
of problems. 
The functionalist enterprise is deficient in ways that a dualists and eliminativists draw 
attention to constantly, but which, in agreement with Churchland, are unjustly ignored. 
Reduction seems impossible and this is a problem. It should lead to an ontological distinction, or 
eliminativism, not an “anomalous monism” as Davidson suggests, whatever sense can be made 
of that. What are “mental” properties if not immaterial properties? How does a brain concentrate 
on an entity, like a belief, with immaterial properties? Intentionality is a Trojan horse, if the 
physicalist accepts its phenomenlogical characteristics, they must abandon their position. 
Interpretative considerations either mistranslate our ability to self-deceive, or our 
inability to pin down the content of another’s mental states, as cues to the unreality of intentional 
states. They also seem to make the unwarranted claim that “…the mental itself exists ‘only as 
described’…” and leave us with a baffling problem of why any human in history would ever 
have started to use this interpretative scheme in the first place if it did not have some solid 
ground in their own conscious experience (Madell, Mind 77).  
Eliminativism has prospects, and no one is going to stop the enterprise of cognitive 
science, but as it stands we seem more warranted in the belief that our intentional states have a 
robust existence, than that some future description of social interactions in terms of neuron-
detected micro-features could seriously endanger that belief.  
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Lastly, let’s remember that it’s not just beliefs that are the problem, as Madell says, 
“merely entertaining a thought is just as impossible to accommodate within a materialist 
framework as a fully-fledged belief” (Mind 66). 
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IV.	  Physicalism’s	  Epistemological	  Precipice	  
Now, with or without eliminative materialism, I want to demonstrate that physicalism 
about human beings, conjoined with a naturalist worldview, leads any person to a state of 
skepticism that, at the very least, should provoke some re-consideration of their belief in 
physicalism. I will be using Plantinga’s “Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism” to show 
why this is the case. I take this to be a major consideration and, along with the two problems 
already pointed out, reason enough to reject physicalism.  
Preliminaries:	  
Warrant	  &	  Your	  Brain	  On	  XX	  
The first preliminary is Plantinga's undergirding account of warranted belief. There are 
several requirements for a belief to be warranted. I’ll state each and the reasons for their 
necessity.   
 The first requirement is that the belief be produced by properly functioning cognitive 
faculties (Plantinga, Knowledge 11). This is meant to modify the too-simple idea that, if 
generally reliable processes produce a belief, it’s automatically warranted. Your sight may in 
general be reliable, but if you are intoxicated what you see will no longer be as reliable, and the 
beliefs formed during that period of malfunction (like, “Someone added more stairs to this 
staircase, it’s never taken this long to get to the top.”) are not warranted.  
 The second requirement is that the faculty at work has as its purpose the production of 
true belief (12). Say I have a deadly illness and come to believe, against all odds, that I will 
recover. The faculty at work may have as its purpose the production of what is probably a false 
belief, because it will have other good effects on me (i.e. a less painful and/or less difficult death 
emotionally or even heightening my slim chances at recovery). So, though this over-optimism is 
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actually the result of a properly functioning faculty, the purpose is not the production of true 
belief, thus is not warranted. 
 The third requirement is that the faculties producing the belief are doing so in the 
appropriate cognitive macro-environment. A cognitive macro-environment is the general 
environment in which our cognitive faculties were designed to function under. For example, the 
earth’s atmosphere is the appropriate macro-environment for our visual faculties. 
 The fourth requirement is that the properly functioning faculty, aimed at truth, and in a 
favorable macro-environment, is successful in its attempts (12)31. We can allow for “success” 
here to simply mean that the faculty, when all the above conditions are met, produces 
significantly more than 50% true beliefs (pick any number your comfortable with, I would prefer 
something in the range of 80%). Imagine that a “junior deity”, as Plantinga suggests, was 
responsible for the appearance of humans on earth. Unfortunately, its lack of maximal 
knowledge caused it to overlook some details and now, even when we are working the way we 
were designed to, in the right macro-environment, and are using the faculties aimed at producing 
true belief, we might still acquire mostly false beliefs because of the faulty design.  
 Finally, the last requirement is that the faculties be functioning in a favorable mini-
environment. A favorable mini-environment is one in which the cognitive faculties producing the 
belief, which are successfully aimed at producing true belief when functioning properly, actually 
do produce true beliefs (Crisp 48).  A mini-environment is, quoting Crisp, “a detailed state of 
affairs which includes all epistemically relevant circumstances obtaining when the belief issuing 
from E is formed” (43). A house of mirrors is a mini-environment, contained within the larger 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 The additional requirement of a favorable mini-environment in Crisp's essay actually makes it so that 
this final requirement is assumed, and mini-environments are a buffer to Gettier-style objections in 
specific circumstances. Either way, it's important for what follows and so I include it separately. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  55	  	  
maxi-environment of earth. So, even if we are in a favorable cognitive macro-environment, like 
here on earth, we can be in an unfavorable mini-environment, like a house of mirrors. If we’ve 
never been in a house of mirrors before, the unfavorable mini-environment can deceive us into 
thinking there is a person to the right of us who is actually behind us, the most rational thing to 
do is to just trust your sight. In such a case, our sight would be functioning properly, and our 
macro-environment is favorable, but the micro-environment is misleading and some of the 
beliefs we form with respect to our vision do not have warrant for us32.  
 So, the requirements for the warrant of a belief are that the belief be produced by 
properly functioning cognitive faculties who successfully achieve their purpose of producing 
true belief when in their favorable macro-environment and that the specific microenvironment in 
which the belief is formed is not misleading.  
 A second preliminary to the argument involves understanding the use of the words 
“rationality”, and the idea of “defeaters” for beliefs. There are two kinds of rationality, and two 
kinds of defeaters that will come into play. First, there’s “proper function rationality” (PFR 
hereafter) (Plantinga, Naturalism 205).  Plantinga explains PFR so:  
“the rational thing to believe, in circumstances C, is what a properly functioning human 
being—more exactly, one whose cognitive or rational faculties are functioning properly 
in the relevant respects—would believe in those circumstances” (205).  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 There are important nuances to the epistemology, and I encourage a reading of Crisp's essay “Gettier 
and Plantinga's revised account of warrant” to see them. Though I have found some problems with 
Crisp's account myself and revised his definition of an unfavorable mini-environment in an essay. It is 
also important to note that environment means “states of affairs”, not directly perceptible surroundings. 
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Tied to PFR, there are “proper function rationality defeaters” (PFRD hereafter). Proposition D is 
a PFRD for Proposition B for me at time t iff at t my “noetic structure”33 includes B, I come to 
believe D at t, and any human whose cognitive faculties are working properly, who has the same 
noetic structure as I do, and who comes to believe D “but nothing else independent of or stronger 
than D, would withhold B (or believe it less strongly)” (208). 
  An illustration Plantinga gives here is if you ingested the drug XX, which you believe is 
designed to make the cognitive faculties of those who take it unreliable for a month, starting one 
hour after taking it, but unable to detect their own unreliability (208). In fact XX has succeeded 
in doing this for decades of clinical trials to 95% of subjects. You believe that you’ve taken the 
drug, but you keep believing your cognitive faculties are reliable (call this belief “R” hereafter) 
despite the improbability of this belief (5%) for one of two reasons, or both.  
First, you cannot function in the world if you have serious doubts about your cognitive 
faculties (208). Second, your maintaining belief in R is part of the expected results of XX when 
it hits the bloodstream in properly functioning humans. If you detected the mentally confused 
state XX has caused, you’d be an evolutionary anomaly and probably would have some 
cognitive hardware that could in other scenarios be detrimental.34  
   One could tie PFR to our discussion of warrant by saying that PFR is the fulfillment of 
the first and third requirements, and whether or not the others are fulfilled is a matter to decide in 
the specific situation. In the case of taking XX, you would be rational in believing R, in the PFR 
sense, but would not have warrant as defined above because requirement two is not met (207). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 One's noetic structure is the totality of beliefs one has, all of them being traced back to few, or simply 
significantly fewer, foundational beliefs. One such foundational belief we will look at in what follows 
is the belief that one's cognitive faculties are generally reliable.  
34 This is just an observation on evolutionary adaptations. Seldom are mutations simply beneficial, there 
is often a give-and-take in play that would make the mutations detrimental outside of the particular 
environmental circumstances they arose in. Perhaps this immunity to XX is paired with dyscalculia.  
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The faculties working to keep R intact are geared towards either straightforward deception, or 
towards keeping a life-threatening skepticism at arm’s length, they do not have as their purpose 
the production of true belief. There is a sense then, in which you would be irrational in keeping 
belief in R. This is what Plantinga calls the “alethic” sense of rationality.  
 Alethic rationality includes only the results of cognitive faculties whose purpose is the 
production of true belief. Returning to our example, you would have an alethic rationality 
defeater (ARD) for R. ARD’s can be defined by adding this idealization to the definition of 
PFRD above: All of the cognitive faculties of the “properly functioning” human being placed in 
my circumstances have as their function the production of true belief and nothing else, and 
successfully carry out that function (209). So, there are alethic and non-alethic processes (over-
optimism is an example of an effect of non-alethic processes), and the results of the two 
processes can sometimes conflict (like your belief that taking XX should make you unreliable, 
but still thinking that you should rely on your faculties, because otherwise, even moving at all 
becomes a serious problem).  
 Closing these preliminaries out, we can see that though belief in R an hour after ingesting 
XX is in line with PFR, belief in R does not have warrant and you would have an ARD for R. If 
it weren’t for those other processes keeping you from rejecting R, you would give it up 
completely. Actually, Plantinga suggests that in this scenario you do still have a sort of PFRD for 
R.  He calls it a “Humean rationality defeater” (211). This is because you can postulate what you 
think another person should believe in such a situation if they were only using alethic processes, 
and you “don’t know of anything that distinguishes [your] case from theirs” (210). Thus, the 
proper functioning of your rational faculties results in the belief that R is probably not true for 
you.  
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 The “Humean” part of this is that having a ARD to disbelieve R results in a state of 
skepticism which cannot be held for long because it conflicts with PFR, but which can be 
recognized in so much as we humans are able to “take a condescending and dismissive stance 
with respect to these promptings of nature” (211). In other words, you would be functioning 
ideally when you are able to recognize that R is unwarranted given your ingestion of XX, but 
you cannot maintain this doubt at all times because of conflicting pulls in PFR. Plantinga cites 
Hume’s “Treatise” as a good expression of the frustration that can arise when ARD conflict with 
our PFR (Hume found that his own presuppositions logically led to a debilitating skepticism): 
 
Where am I, or what? From what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition 
shall I return? …I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in 
the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the deepest darkness, and 
utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty (qtd. in Plantinga, Reply 210). 
 
Nice as Hume makes us feel, we’ll now talk about the argument with our definitions of warrant 
and defeaters in the background.  
The Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism  
“Philosophical Naturalism” is, basically, the belief that there are no supernatural entities 
(Plantinga, Naturalism i). The God of the Christian Bible, or anything like God, would be an 
example of a supernatural entity. Other examples would include Satan, angels, demons, and, of 
central importance here, immaterial souls. Thought of in this way, naturalism is close to 
materialism. But since differing definitions could cause problems, we can rely on the central 
notion being the first sentence of the paragraph and it will be sufficient. Naturalism entails 
physicalism with respect to human beings, so from here on out we are addressing naturalism (and 
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thus at least weakening the case for physicalism and opening the door for entities such 
immaterial minds to exist). Currently, the most accepted view of human origins is that given 
by the evolutionary story. Current evolutionary theory claims that all life has sprung from 
common unicellular ancestors by way of random genetic mutation being filtered through natural 
selection and genetic drift (2). To set the argument in its proper context, pace some popular but 
naïve views presented in many undergraduate university courses, evolutionary theory is not 
incompatible with supernaturalism. Many Christians, for example, believe that the evolutionary 
story told by the sciences is for the most part correct, minus metaphysical imports like 
naturalism, and that God in fact guided the course of evolution to produce organisms like our 
bodies, so that we could navigate the physical world in a sophisticated way.35  
 Putting that aside, we can take the evolutionary view of human origins and join it with 
naturalism to bring us to the consequences of the EAAN which I believe should make anyone 
with such views change their position.36 Before doing that, I’ll adopt the hypothetical situation 
that Plantinga does and imagine creatures that are like us in every respect except perhaps some 
aesthetic differences, like being two feet taller on average and having long necks. They have all 
the same cognitive faculties we have and have come to exist by way of evolution. We’ll call 
them “Meses”.  
 Now, evolution is “concerned” with behavior, with getting organisms from point A to 
point B so that they can eat, reproduce, and survive. Everything is meant to enhance those 
primary objectives. Patricia Churchland in talking about the brain puts it so:  “Boiled down to the 
essentials, a nervous system enables the organism to succeed in the four F’s: feeding, fleeing, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 I couldn’t argue for this here, but one could look to Francis Collins, Alvin Plantinga, B.B. Warfield 
decades ago, as examples of Christians who hold this as a possibility.   
36 I suppose after some grappling with the argument, relevant literature, and their own intuitions.  
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feeding, and reproducing…Truth, whatever that is, definitely takes the hindmost (4).” Further, 
beliefs in general are by-products of evolution. If this is the case, then it seems very unlikely that 
such by-products were selected for on the basis of their truth. Actually, it seems like belief-
producing mechanisms would be selected for only on the basis of their connection to fitness-
enhancing behavior. The EAAN states that because of this situation, the probability that the 
Meses’ cognitive faculties are reliable belief-producing mechanisms37 (“R” hereafter), given 
naturalism (“N”) and evolution (“E”) is low, or inscrutable (4). This is expressed as:  “P(R/N&E) 
is low or inscrutable”.  
 Whether this is actually the case will depend on the relation between adaptive behavior, 
which is what natural selection is primarily geared towards producing, and belief (5). Plantinga 
lists “four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities” for this relation.  
 The first (P1) is straightforward epiphenomenalism. This would mean that beliefs have 
no causal efficacy whatsoever to produce behavior. Apparently this is actually a very popular 
view among biologists. If movements are determined wholly by biochemistry then beliefs are by-
products, and not important to how the organism moves. One can easily see that in this scenario 
the Mesis should believe that P(R/N&E&epiphenomenalism) will be stupendously low, or 
inscrutable. 
 The next option (P2) is semantic epiphenomenalism. This means that beliefs can affect 
behavior through their syntactical properties38 but not their semantic properties (6). For a 
physicalist, a belief must be a material thing of some sort, probably involving neurons. The 
syntactical properties of a belief then, would be things like “the number of neurons involved in 
the belief, the connections between them, their firing thresholds..” (7). But, one can quickly see 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Again we can simply think of reliable as producing comfortably more than 50% true beliefs than false.  
38 Basically, their material properties in the neural structures or processes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  61	  	  
why this will still leave the probability or P(R/N&E) as very low or inscrutable. Truth is a 
semantic property; beliefs are true or false in virtue of their meanings, their content, not by way 
of any neural structure or material properties. If semantic properties do not enter as one of the 
causes of behavior, truth cannot be selected for in evolutionary processes, and hence if the 
Meses’ cognitive faculties consistently produced true belief, it would be quite a coincidence (a 
sort of naturalistic miracle).39 
 The third and fourth options (P3 & P4) are that beliefs are causally efficacious to 
behavior by way of their semantics and that they are either maladaptive anyway (P3), or adaptive 
(P4) (8). If they are maladaptive, obviously P(R/N&E) will stay low. If they are adaptive 
however, how does this affect the probability of R given N&E? Still not much it seems; just 
because the Meses’ beliefs help it to successfully live, they need not be true. The crux of the 
matter lies in the fact that any one action can be brought about by a plethora of belief-desire 
combinations (8). They could eat fruits because they believe that some ingredient in fruits will 
keep evil spirits from inhabiting their body and they don’t want evil spirits in their body. They 
could run away from a tiger because though they want to be eaten, they always believe there’s a 
better tiger to be eaten by (8). On a more systemic level that would make sense to a naturalist, 
they could almost all have beliefs in things like a personal God, immaterial beings, and beliefs 
that their identity is grounded in their being some kind of immaterial entity themselves. From a 
naturalistic perspective all such beliefs would be false, but would serve some adaptive purpose. 
Since there are near limitless ways in which such systemic blunders could occur and yet produce 
successful behavior, the chances that the Mesis’ cognitive faculties produce true belief more than 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Here we can see a precursor to the argument as a whole. Imagine if the Mesis came to know about their 
condition and the semantic epiphenomenalism that pervades their belief-producing faculties. If they 
came to this information through their cognitive faculties (not sure how else they would) then this 
information itself would be suspect, and they would enter a sort of self-defeating nebulous of 
uncertainty.  
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50% of the time, and are thus reliable (a generously low request), are still extremely poor for 
them or inscrutable.  
To put the Meses’ problem more systematically I’ll import Plantinga’s use of the probability 
calculus40 in his argument:  
“P(R/N&E)= P(R/N&E&C) x P(C/N&E) + P(R/N&E&-C) x P(-C/N&E)”41  
What’s been done is to eliminate P3 from consideration since “its contribution to 
P(R/N&E) can safely be ignored”(9).42 We then reduce P1 and P2 to their central thesis about 
beliefs:  “-C”, the idea that the content of a belief does not enter the causal chain leading to 
behavior. P4 is now “C” and means that the content of a belief does enter the causal chain of 
behavior and is adaptive. So the probability of R on N&E depends on how probable R is on N&E 
and C [P(R/N&E&C) on the left] or –C [P(R/N&E&~C) on the right], conjoined with the 
probability of either C or –C being true for the Meses given N&E (the right side of each 
multiplication).  
Following Plantinga further, it seems as though “-C” is the natural view to take, for any 
Meses who is a naturalist. If beliefs are, most essentially, physical states, then content seems to 
be an unnecessary tack-on for the success of the organism. Finishing off this hypothetical 
scenario with Plantinga we can plug in estimates to the equation. If    P(–C/N&E) is high, say .7, 
then P(C/N&E) will be .3; let's also say that  “P(R/N&E&-C) is .2” This leads us to conclude 
that the probability of  the whole equation, and thus of  P(R/N&E) “will be at most .45, less than 
½” (10)43. Because these numbers are being plugged in through nothing but intuition, one may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 It seems to be an alteration of Baye's Theorem, I explain it's meaning.  
41 “i.e., the probability of R on N&E is the weighted average of the probabilities of R on N&E&C and 
N&E&-C (weighted by the probabilities of C and –C on N&E) (10).” 
42 This is just because there's no way to see how it would raise the probability of R.  
43 Plugging in the estimates: P(R/N&E)= (1 x .3) + (.2 x .7) 
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think that a Meses should simply withhold belief about R, but now, the P(R/N&E) is, in the end, 
low or inscrutable. The end results can now be assessed.  
 All Meses who are naturalists have an alethic rationality defeater and a Humean 
rationality defeater for R, though they may have PFR in some sense. Like we said earlier, it may 
be that belief in R is in some way necessary for them to function without going insane, or to 
prevent them from becoming very depressed or paranoid about their every move. Nonetheless, 
this sense of rationality can be seen for what it is, a frail coping mechanism. The ARD cannot be 
rationally defeated. This is because any attempt to make R more likely will be done by 
modifying underlying beliefs or adding to their background beliefs or trying in some way to use 
the cognitive faculties that they now have a defeater for. Basically, the only way is to employ 
some sort of epistemically circular argument (242). They may still believe R but they cannot now 
reasonably (in the AR or ideal PFR sense) believe R. They must concede that their belief in R is 
the result of processes that are not geared towards true belief, and then stop thinking about it.  
 Another thing the naturalist Meses cannot now reasonably believe is, well, anything. This 
includes their belief in naturalism. Since naturalism is the reason that the probabilities within the 
original estimates are low or inscrutable, the Meses, if they care about being rational, should 
either give up belief in naturalism, or belief in R, or belief in reason. Obviously the whole 
deploying of the Meses as the species in question is only meant to lessen the blow of the 
argument and emotional kickbacks a reader may feel along the way. What we’ve been getting at 
is that any human who believes in naturalism and evolution cannot reasonably believe both. 
Rejecting naturalism opens the door for entities such as immaterial minds or souls to exist; it 
allows for physicalism with respect to human beings to be wrong. Exploring alternate 
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possibilities will, to the relief of those who make the move and investigate, offer solutions to the 
skeptical problems posed by this argument.  
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V.	  Personal	  Identity	  
There is another fundamental aspect of experience that seems to pose a looming problem 
for the physicalist: personal identity through time. Most people live under the assumption that 
despite the plethora of changes in their bodies and mental lives (changes in character, beliefs, 
new and “lost” memories) they are fundamentally the same person as the one who was born on 
“their” birthday. This view of identity could best be identified as an “absolutist view of personal 
identity” (Moreland & Rae 179). What’s being claimed is that personal identity conforms to 
Leibniz’s law of the indiscernability of identicals: if x=y (if x is identical with y), then whatever 
is true of x is true of y and vice versa (56). Unlike a physical object, like a table, which could still 
“partially be the same” as an earlier table of which it has kept 50% of its parts44, each person is 
who they are, could not be someone else, and cannot be only partially identical to themselves or 
other persons (179).  
What’s a ship?  
A Physicalist’s Identity Crisis  
 This natural conception of ourselves comes into conflict with a physicalist view of human 
persons in such a way that it should, again, provoke a re-examination of the view itself and of the 
epistemic weight being given to third-person descriptions as against the first-person descriptions 
of the experiences we have. A physicalist will have to either give up the absolutist conception of 
personal identity, or find reasons for defending it on physicalist grounds. With a popular example 
described by Peter Van Inwagen called: “Theseus’ ship” we can explore these two options and 
bring out the problems facing physicalism.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 One should note that this also means that the table is not strictly identical to the table it used to be, if its 
identity is only based on physical properties. 
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 Theseus has a ship, call it the “Ariadne”, and sails on it for 30 years, over the course of 
which each wooden plank and sail that makes up the ship is replaced. All the planks and sails are 
put in the same dump (Van Inwagen, Metaphysics 236). Then, Stilpo reconstructs a ship using 
the same planks and sails, and puts them in the exact same arrangement (say even with all the 
same nails) as Theseus’ original construction. Now we have the original ship that Theseus 
constructed (O), the reconstructed ship that Stilpo has made (R), and the continuous ship which 
Theseus has been sailing on, the one he calls the Ariadne (C).  
 The problems and their relation to physicalism can be quickly seen. If a ship is just “a 
hunk of matter”, then, if ship A is ship B they must have all the same components and properties 
(qua Leibniz’s law). Obviously then, ship C is not the same as ship O (239). Which ship is the 
Ariadne? To Theseus, the answer to that question would be ship C, but this is not a telling fact 
about the nature of identity, it could just be a useful fiction of sorts, a way for the government to 
collect taxes. Has there been one ship that Theseus has been sailing on, or thousands of different 
ones simply named the same? It seems as though, if we apply Leibniz’s law consistently, every 
plank replacement was the end of an old ship and the start of a new one. Is ship O the same as 
ship R? If (and only if) all the properties that were possessed by O are possessed by R, it seems 
as though we’d say yes.  
 These questions and answers are analogues of those a physicalist should ask about a 
human person. If human persons are identical with purely physical objects, namely human 
bodies, and a human body, like the Ariadne, changes all of its parts, which body is identical with 
the person? How could a person remain the same physical object through a complete 
replacement of all its parts? For the Ariadne, ship C was not the same as ship O. Applying this to 
yourself, a human person, this would mean, not that you have changed drastically from who you 
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were 15 years ago, but rather that there was no you 15 years ago; the person that was identified 
by your name 15 years ago was not you at all. 
 
The Psychological-Continuity Criterion for Identity 
 Because of the obvious problem in grounding personal identity in physical properties of 
composition, some physicalists adopt a “psychological-continuity criterion of identity” (PCC 
hereafter). This is the idea that human persons can persist through time, though the bodies they 
are do not, if the memories and mental properties of a body at time t2 (your body at the present 
moment, say), arise through the right kind of causal process from those of a previous body at t1 
(say your body ten years ago) (239). 
 What would this process be? The task of delineating this without falling back, at some 
point, to commonsense notions seems daunting. Usually though, continuity of memories and 
beliefs are what make it obvious that the same person has existed through time, and this is the 
general idea behind this strategy. However, a science-fiction-like possibility that Peter Van 
Inwagen proposes is that PCC would allow us to transfer all the information from one brain, to 
another “artificially grown” and “blank-slate” adult brain (in an artificially grown, adult body), 
via some yet unknown technology. We'd then say that the latter (the previously blank-slate body) 
is now the same person as the person from which the information was taken, since it will now 
have all the same memories and beliefs as the first, perhaps even remembering that they were 
about to have a body transfer. This seems to imply that the person is not, strictly speaking, their 
body, but rather something else (memories and other information), and this in turn seems to 
mean that the PCC contradicts the basic physicalist premise that a person is identical to their 
body (239).  
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One immediate response by the physicalist could be that this particular method of 
transferring all the information would not be the right kind of process. An immediate response to 
that, is that if all the memories and belies are transferred, the burden is on the physicalist to 
answer why not. Is the process really what grounds identity, or the results of the process? For 
now, we will stick with memories and mental states being the relevant factor being sought by 
PCC. We'll address any thinkers who equate identity to a process below. 
 Is there refuge from the charge of contradiction facing the combination of PCC (thus the 
brain-info. transfer) and the belief that a person is identical to their body? Van Inwagen lists two 
options. One could hold to the relativity of identity, essentially meaning that “there is really no 
such thing as identity”45, rather, there are a plethora of different kinds of “identity-relations” 
which we employ when we talk about different things (240). We say “is the same car as…”, “is 
the same collection of atoms as…” and these denote slightly different relations with the word 
“is”, though they all mean some kind of identity relation46. So, a physicalist may say that the “is” 
in the phrases “x is the same person as y” and “x is the same human organism as y” have 
different meanings, and thus being the same organism does not equate with being the same 
person (240)47. Still, when a physicalist who holds to the relativity of identity claims that “person 
x at t2 is the same person as y at t1” (again, even if they claim that it’s different from claiming “x 
is the same human organism as y”), the relation denoted by “is” is probably that x’s mental states 
have come to be from y’s in a particular kind of way. In other words, they are still holding to a 
PCC for identity when talking about human persons, but do not face “formal contradiction” in so 
doing (240).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Or “there is no one relation properly called 'identity' full-stop” 
46 The distinction here is not between the “is of identity” and the “is of predication”, rather it is between 
different “kinds” of “is's of identity”.  
47 How to do this I know not, and thinking it through some will make it obvious why few philosophers 
support the view.  
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 We'll import another thought experiment to shed more light on how the PCC fails to 
achieve its purpose. Since thus far, even if someone ascribes to the relativity of identity, the PCC 
seems to be the only way to ground personal identity. Say that at some point in the scientific 
future a scientist is able to split the left and right hemispheres of your brain along with the left 
and right parts of your body (as much as could be done) and reintegrates each with a separate 
half-body without a brain (Moreland and Rae, 184). To complicate this a bit further, both of the 
resulting persons have the same memories and character as you did before the surgery48. Which 
of the two persons are you now? You cannot be both in the same sense49, and drawing on the 
relativity of identity to postulate two different identity relations between the original body and 
the two resulting indistinguishable persons doesn't tell us anything about the kind of relation that 
makes one of the bodies you, since the experiment occurred in virtually the exact same manner 
for both resulting bodies. Neither of the two responses available seems to rescue PCC here. If 
you have completely ceased to exist, then continuity of memories, mental states50 and character 
traits is not sufficient for grounding of identity, because both resulting bodies have those51. If 
only one of the resulting bodies is you, then a physicalist, up to this point, is at a loss to explain 
what about the body makes this the case, since both persons in the half-body transfer came to be 
through the same process. 
 The other option Van Inwagen lays out for responding to the brain-info. transfer scenario 
we mentioned at first, and now also the half brain/half body transfer, is that a physicalist could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Not preposterously far fetched, brains can take over most of the functions of damaged hemispheres. 
49 Insert anything else as an example here to demonstrate the absurdity: “I cut the table in half and 
connected each half to two other separate halves. I guess that now, both tables are identical with the 
first one.”; no, one is, or neither is, what’s certain is that there are now two distinct tables. 
50 There is a sense in which dualists believe that any given mental state is necessarily owned by whoever 
has it and that that aspect of mental states cannot be transferred (Moreland and Rae 160). 
51 Perhaps, again, they have not come to have them by the appropriate kind of causal process, but this is 
grounding identity more in the process and not in the memories, mental states, and character traits. This 
idea will be brought up below.  
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maintain a four-dimensionalist view of identity. This basically means that objects are not merely 
three-dimensional, but four-dimensional objects extended in space-time (Van Inwagen, 
Metaphysics 241). As such, they exist in a “region of space-time that extends…from the first 
moment of...[their] existence, through the present, to the last moment of… [their] existence—if 
there is a last moment of…[their] existence…(241)” Going all the way back to Theseus’ ship, 
this theory would maintain that ship (C), which Theseus has been riding on, is the Ariadne, and 
all the individual planks have parts (like the part extended from June 1700-July 1702 for plank 
#28) which are parts of the ship Ariadne. But, no plank is ever part of the Ariadne, full-stop; only 
the four-dimensional parts during which the plank contributed (or is contributing) to the structure 
of the Ariadne are.  
 So, though at any point during your four-dimensional existence, you are made-up of three 
dimensional atoms, no atom is a part of you full-stop. All the atoms which compose your body 
can change, and there is no contradiction in saying that you have continued to be the same 
person, your identity lies in the full, four-dimensional aspect. But, it does seem like one needs to 
add a PCC, or something like it, to tie together all the “three-dimensional cross sections” of your 
four-dimensional existence and make it so that only one specific body is your body. With the 
Ariadne, though four-dimensionalism justifies the idea that ship C can be the same ship, there’s 
no positive reason in four-dimensionalism by itself for thinking that the ship Theseus has been 
on for the past 30 years has been one ship besides Theseus’ labeling it so52 (242). In adding the 
PCC here to ground identity however, four-dimensionalism opens itself up to the same kind of 
problem already raised to PCC, and is really no solution.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 In studying identity more, I am drawing closer and closer to the idea that identity is fundamentally 
reliant upon the mental, my other essay on Van Inwagen’s chapter on “Individuality” in his book 
“Metaphysics” brings forth how establishing the individual identity of any physical object is 
problematic. Though I did not write this in that essay, I think that appeal to the primacy of the mental is 
the way to resolve the problem.  
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 For example, how do we apply four-dimensionalism to our two sci-fi surgeries? Perhaps 
four dimensionalism would say that brain-information transfer does result in the same person. 
But, on four-dimensionalism, which person is you (if any) after the half-body transfer? It seems 
as though the stalemate is still present for four-dimensionalism since one needs a PCC to 
separate off human persons as distinct individual entities in the first place, and both persons in 
our scenario come to be through the same general process (thus we have no reason to think 
they're different persons from the original person who was “split”, but that can't be right).  
 
Organic Identity 
Persons as Organisms and Processes 
 In any event, Van Inwagen points out that both the relativity of identity and four-
dimensionalism are unpleasant and carry results that may not be worth the price of maintaining 
physicalism.53 His proposal is to instead make it part of the definition of an organism that it can 
change its parts over time (245). He quotes physiologist J.Z. Young in saying:  
 
“The essence of a living thing is that it consists of atoms of the ordinary chemical 
elements we have listed, caught up into the living system and made part of it for a 
while”(244) (bold emphasis mine). 
 
But, with this idea in place, one can now take a puzzle John Foster discusses and pose it to Van 
Inwagen, Van Inwagen being a physicalist who does not deny the existence of the mental: 
 
“Someone treads on Jones’ foot…Our normal practice is to ascribe the pain-state to 
Jones himself…But why not ascribe it instead to some corporeal part of Jones [like his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 He quotes Judith Thomson’s essay “Parthood and Identity across Time” in saying that four-
dimensionalism is “a crazy metaphysic”, and that “Very few philosophers have any sympathy with the 
theory of the relativity of identity” (242). This is not a refutation of course. I just mention that because 
to treat the whole view on its own would be a job I’m not able to undertake just now.  
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foot]...Or alternatively…to Jones together with the room…or even to the whole physical 
world” (Taliaferro 167)?  
The point here is that if there are mental states characterized as “being in pain”, whether 
supervening-on or identical-to a purely physical state (or states), there seems to be, for the 
physicalist, no necessary distinction as to what part of the physical cosmos has that experience as 
its own (167).54 
Van Inwagen (or any physicalist) could say: there are necessary “law governed 
correlations between the brain and mental life...” which make it such that only “certain sorts of 
biological animals can be persons”, and as such only those animals can be said to have 
experiences (something akin to the PCC). But, then it would seem to follow that the brain, or 
some other part of the body, is what “has the experience”. Surely our nose does not experience 
the pain when our foot is stepped on. The implication is that the subject to whom we attribute 
experiences could be identified with a body part, in this case the brain. This would mean that the 
criterion of identity that Van Inwagen has proposed will fall apart. We’re no longer talking about 
an organism as a whole that can change parts, just a part of the organism that is at the 
metaphorical heart of their identity. But now the physicalist would be open to the criticisms 
already mentioned, like how can a brain be identified as the person if all of its parts have 
changed over time? We’d have to add “being able to change all its parts” to the definition of a 
brain, and the same question arises to what grounds the identity of the brain as the same brain 
and what part of it is the “subject” of a pain-state. The physicalist cannot answer Foster's 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 This delves a bit into the idea of whether subjective experience should hold epistemic weight. If we 
think that the phenomena of “having an experience as one distinct conscious subject” is something to 
pay attention to, then who this subject is will be answered by establishing what it means for a person to 
have identity through time, and I maintain that dualism does a better job of this. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  73	  	  
challenge of identifying the individual person that is the subject of experience if he maintains 
that the identity of a person is grounded in their being a body55.  
 However, if a physicalist still wishes to maintain, without further argument, that it was 
Jones as a whole biological entity that had the experience it seems as though they would be 
identifying Jones with a token of a type of physical process. What would “Jones was stepped on 
and is in pain” mean but a particular assemblage of matter being stepped on, nerves sending 
electrical impulses off in a particular way up the central nervous system through the brain, then 
ending at some point perhaps after causing reactions in other parts of the organism, none of the 
parts being conscious subjects56 but merely conduits of physical processes?57   
 To say “Persons are processes” does not just mean that persons undergo, sometimes 
drastic, changes in physical appearance and personality. Physicalists and dualists alike would 
agree to that. Neither does the idea have anything to do with things like coming of age or 
learning. Think of other physical processes: chlorophyll production in plants, metamorphosis in 
insects, the water cycle from above to below the ground and back again, oxidation of metals. The 
problem for the physicalist is that there is now no unified person, only an abstract process like 
those just mentioned which we use to label certain organisms (perhaps “a human life”). Equating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 A possible answer for the physicalist is to say that part of a person can have an experience, but that 
doesn't mean that that part is that person. I find this hard to believe though. Think of someone who 
loses as many body parts as possible without physically dying. Have they lost parts of their “self” (not 
“themselves”)? If so, have they lost their identity (not, do they feel different or lost part of what they 
felt made them “individuals”, but are they different entities)? If not, then it seems like the physicalist is 
still leaning on either the brain, or a PCC, to ground personal identity. 
56 None of my neurons are in themselves thinking about how heavy this man is, and as I expressed earlier 
in this thesis, it’s unclear how a billion un-thinking neurons can generate a unified conscious subject. 
57 In a simple resolution to all this, dualism says that it was Jones as a basic, nonphysical subject that was 
in pain by virtue of experiencing the physical state he was in. 
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a human person with a physical process is essentially an eliminative view58 that destroys the 
conception we have of ourselves and denies that there are any such things as lasting persons.  
 Tying back to Foster's challenge regarding the ownership of mental states on physicalism, 
we have a basic experience of psychological unity which grounds our experience that 
physicalism cannot account for. We can express this so: At time 1 you experience x, y, z. (say 
the sight, sound, and smell of a pot of soup as you walk towards it). At time 2, you experience 
x2, y2, and z2 (sights, sounds, and smells from the same pot but from a closer perspective). At 
time 3, you experience x3, y3, and z3 (same idea, now standing in front of the stove-top). At 
each time you are aware that only one person is experiencing the x’s, y’s, and z’s, and that it is 
the same person each time, you (Moreland and Rae 183). 
 Reasoning through the premises of an argument also requires that one person be present 
through all the thinking. If there is no enduring self, a logical thinking-through of an argument by 
anyone seems implausible. Physicalists can respond “as each person-stage emerges or ceases to 
be in a series of 'thinkings,' that stage passes on to the next one its content and a feeling of 
ownership ('this thought was mine')”(187). As Moreland and Rae point out, at this juncture all 
that can be done is to offer the total picture as reasons for someone to seriously doubt that this 
makes sense of their experience, and we are getting close to the heart of the matter (187).  
 Hume raised an objection to absolutism (and dualism specifically) relevant here by 
claiming that he was never aware of himself, but only of sensations. Hume would say you were 
aware of the x’s, y’s, and z’s above but not of yourself, because there is no sensation of a 
perceiver behind the senses. The problem with this objection is somewhat obvious. How would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 I am not equating the eliminativism of say, Paul Churchland, to being an eliminativist view of persons. 
Though it’s obvious to many that eliminativism with respect to the mental implies that our conception 
of ourselves will be shattered and will result in an elimination of identity.  
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Hume, or any physicalist, know where to look for the awareness of self to know that it’s 
missing? What does it even mean to have looked for this sensation, or to not be able to find it, if 
there is no substantial self undergoing the looking, or disappointment at not finding it? Further, 
it’s obvious that there will be no sensation analogous to sight or smell when being aware of 
yourself, but there is a mode of awareness given to us that seems pretty basic: while Hume was 
looking for the sensation of the self, there was one person doing all the searching and having all 
the sensations as their own, that he would miss this as a signpost to the underlying reality is more 
the result of his metaphysical commitments than lack of any support (190). 
 Such commitments drive much of the zeal for a physicalist account of personal identity 
over time. In looking at our results and how they run so counter to our subjective experience, a 
physicalist should pause, and not simply write off their experiential evidence. Doing so seems 
tied to the attempt to, at least theoretically, give third-person physical descriptions of all 
phenomena, and subjectivity eludes this attempt. Returning to the split-brain operation, we see 
how a physicalist view of persons treats the first-person perspective as irrelevant. You may wake 
up from the operation and be looking at a duplicate of yourself, and though others would not be 
able to distinguish the difference between you and the other body, you could. A physicalist 
holding a sort of PCC of identity however, would say: “in this situation we should simply claim 
that the original person is the “same” as both new persons...” However, Moreland and Rae 
correctly clarify: “they cannot mean…literal identity…What they mean is that sameness is just 
resemblance…it is arbitrary which one to count as that person [the original, in this case you]” 
(189). The same move, ignoring the first-person and placing epistemic weight on the third 
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person, is echoed all over in the philosophy of mind. I continue to maintain that this move is not 
grounded in facts as experienced, but in ideals driven by metaphysical commitments.59  
 To close, for a dualist: “personal identity is unanalyzable and primitive…The I is ultimate 
and serves as the unifier of persons…” (180). All our different sensations and thoughts and 
memories are ours because we as individual persons have them. The fact that we have them all is 
founded on our identity, not constitutive of it. Internal properties of conscious experience like 
psychological unity and existing as one person through time are the first facts to be taken into 
account in trying to settle the question of what we are and what grounds our identity. Such 
experiences, along with others like the intentionality of thoughts and qualia, fit best within a 
substance dualist perspective and as such they lend yet more reason to adopt a dualist position on 
human nature over-against a physicalist one which must ignore or seriously distort them (180).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Dennett’s “Intentional Stance”, discussed in an earlier section, is an example of the (in my opinion, 
unsuccessful) attempt to naturalize the intentionality of thoughts.  
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VI.	  Physicalism,	  Dualism,	  and	  Bioethics	  
 With all the objections and insufficiencies of physicalism that we have seen in mind, we 
can now turn to societal issues to which the question of human nature is potently relevant. There 
are a plethora of moral decisions to which one's views on human nature can significantly 
contribute, and since it is individuals who in the end vote on and form public policy, discussing 
the reasons individuals have for their vote can inform how we make decisions in the public 
sphere. I’ll be drawing from Moreland and Rae's excellent treatment of substance dualism and its 
implications for ethics in Body & Soul, Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics. I'll address  
abortion, and, more briefly, reproductive technologies, genetic engineering, human cloning (even 
more briefly), and end of life care. 
 First, an important distinction made by Moreland and Rae should be explained. In their 
version of substance dualism, which they call "Thomistic dualism”, the soul is more than simply 
the mind (21). It is the fundamental unifier of the person, that which underlies the development 
of the organism as a whole, and is metaphysically prior to the development of its parts. 
Furthermore, there are capacities that persons possess simply in virtue of being persons. These 
are second-order capacities. The actual ability to develop and use these capacities is a first-order 
capacities. First-order capacities are not constitutive of personhood, while second-order 
capacities essentially belong to every person just because persons are souls with an intrinsic 
nature (203). They offer a simple illustration. A second-order capacity one may have is the 
ability to learn to speak Arabic, English, and many other languages. Contrast this with the lower, 
first-order capacity one may have to actually speak Arabic and/or the lack of the first order 
capacity to speak English (203). Moreland and Rae do not draw this out too far, but one could 
also talk about the third order capacity to learn languages in general, and the capacity to engage 
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in cognitive activity as a fourth order capacity, until ultimate capacities are reached (this may be 
the limit relevant to this example). Finally, one's lower capacities can only be developed in the 
appropriate environment, but the lack of their development does not entail their absence from a 
person (i.e. not being able to learn various languages because of being poor and not affording 
education, or learning language at all because one was, say, isolated from all communication 
with other persons). This distinction is important in all the morally problematic issues that 
follow.  
Human Persons and Abortion 
 The current federal legislation on abortion allows (broadly) for abortions past the second 
trimester and into the third only if justified by a concern for the well-being of the mother. This is 
contrary to the popular notion that past the second trimester abortion is illegal. In fact, well-being 
is construed to include psychological, emotional, even financial factors if played right. This was 
established in the Doe v. Bolton case, a decision made on the same day as Roe v. Wade. Here is 
the relevant quote:  
 
We agree that the medical judgment [of the mother's physician, as to whether continuing 
the pregnancy constitutes a threat to the mother's health] may be exercised in light of all 
factors–physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the women's age–relevant to the 
well-being of the patient. All these facts may relate to health [of the pregnant woman]. 
(Moreland and Rae 238) 
 
Perhaps less known is that most late-term abortions are not done for health related reasons, but 
rather other things that can be construed as "well-being" of the mother, or even of the child 
(238).  
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 Some have attempted to justify abortion on the grounds that a fetus is merely an 
extension of the mother's body, and is not a person. The crucial point is that these are attempts to 
ground personhood. As we saw in the last section, prospects are grim for the continuing identity 
of persons on physicalism, and these attempts at functionalist accounts of personhood fare no 
better.  
 The common strategy of such attempts is to draw a distinction between "human persons" 
and mere "human beings", where “human beings” are basically the biological organism minus 
whatever criteria are set-up for personhood. This distinction would have serious implications for 
positions on personal identity also, though it is usually not thought through enough. If the person 
is not their body, the biological organism, then somehow mental life is constitutive of 
personhood, but mental life as an abstract event is not sufficient grounds for identity (Is the 
process the person? a certain kind of mental activity qualifies as a person? or what?). There must 
be a subject of mental events, and the distinctions made by physicalists we are about to see 
usually draw heavily on ideas such as intention and self-awareness which seem to be better 
situated within a substance dualist position.  
 Prominent thinkers like bioethicist Joseph Fletcher, philosophers Mary Warren, Peter 
Singer, Helga Kuhse and Bonnie Steinbock all have views of the human person which warrant 
abortion but which, in the end, are not satisfactory as analyses of personhood. They all rely on 
the notion of conscious awareness and "having an interest in having interests" (248).  
Mary Warren gives the following five specific criteria for personhood:  
 1. consciousness…and in particular the capacity to feel pain 
 2. reasoning… 
 3. self-motivated activity... 
 4. the capacity to communicate…messages of an indefinite variety of types… 
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 5. the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness, individual and/or racial (245). 
Since a fetus cannot, at least to our knowledge, reason, or communicate in the appropriate 
manner, they are not persons, according to Warren, and abortion is permissible. But, these 
criteria are not met by the handicapped or infants either. The obvious implication is that killing 
the handicapped, or infants, could be justified simply in virtue of their not being persons. Warren 
proceeds to argue against this conclusion because infants are " 'so close' to being persons that 
killing them requires additional justification” (qtd. in Moreland, 246), and for the handicapped, 
there are people who are willing to care for them. But if that’s all Warren can offer, then one 
could simply disagree and say killing something that is not a person is not that morally 
problematic. The final escape valve for Warren is the argument that an already born baby is no 
longer a danger to the mother's health. But the extremely small number of cases where this 
would be applicable in the abortion debate makes it a small help to the logical conclusions of her 
criteria.  
 Being somewhat more consistent, Michael Tooley says that infanticide can be justified 
for up to a week after birth, but that drawing an exact line is not necessary (247). His central 
criterion is that a person "must have a sense of a continuing self". But how does a purely 
physical things have a sense of a continuing self? And, when faced with certain psychological 
disorders, Tooley may find his criteria warranting the killing of persons, like a sever 
schizophrenia.  
 Steinbock holds that to be a person one must be able to experience pain or pleasure, and 
thus have interests (248). For Steinbock also, fetuses cannot have these experiences (until an 
unspecified point), and thus abortion is permissible. She is inconsistent in her application of her 
criteria however, since she gives the dead rights (like having their wills carried out), and even 
says that future persons have rights that current generations have the duty to respect (like 
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inheriting a healthy planet) (249). The dead and unborn generations cannot currently experience 
pain or pleasure. Steinbcok disagrees with Tooley's condoning of infanticide by claiming that 
there is a continuity of identity from the newborn baby to the adult person, but this is pretty 
much an arbitrary claim since there is no physically distinguishable point during pregnancy that 
marks the transition from non-person to person.  
 Further, one can ask pointed questions about all these positions. What do we say about 
people under anesthesia, or in reversible comas? Is killing them justified? To appeal to the 
"temporariness" of the condition is to implicitly appeal to the second order capacity of the person 
to be conscious, and the lack of the first order capacity. If this is done in these cases, the same 
should be done in the case of a fetus, and the idea that a fetus is not a person can no longer be 
used to justify abortion. Worse, what do we say about a baby who is born with a lack of higher 
brain functions, but can be treated to develop them? To appeal to their potential to develop these 
higher brain functions is to give up the functionalist criteria of consciousness, or an ability to 
have interests, as grounds for personhood, and instead replace it with some idea of essence, of 
the capacity to develop these capacities, and this is best situated within a substance dualist 
framework (252).  
 Because of issues of personal identity which I delineated in the last section, and the 
problems I have just pointed out, pro-choice advocates have begun to shift the debate from 
whether or not the fetus is actually a person, to whether it is ever permissible to kill a person. 
Pro-choice advocate Naomi Wolf puts the issue powerfully:  
Since abortion became legal nearly a quarter-century ago, the fields of embryology and 
perinatology have been revolutionized, but the prochoice view of the contested fetus has 
been static…So what will it be: Wanted fetuses are charming, complex, REM-dreaming 
little beings whose profile on the sonogram looks just like Daddy, but unwanted ones are 
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mere 'uterine material'?… abortion should be legal; it is sometimes necessary. Sometimes 
the mother must be able to decide that the fetus, in its full humanity, must die (qtd. in 
Moreland 256).  
 
Reproductive Technologies, Cloning, and End-of-Life Care 
 The most problematic issue for reproductive technologies is the status of extracorporeal 
embryos (269). In the most popular methods for enhancing a couple's chances at having children, 
more embryos are commonly created than can reasonably be brought to term (264). For some 
processes, such as in vitro fertilization, the excess embryos are frozen in case none of the first 
four (usually how many are reinserted into the woman's body) are successful, and to avoid 
having to go through the hormonal treatment needed to harvest the eggs from the woman all over 
again (264). Also, sometimes there are an excessive amount of embryos implanted, and if too 
many begin to develop, couples may be referred to another doctor in order to reduce the amount 
of children they will have (265).  
 The arguments condoning whatever means are necessary to successfully lead to 
pregnancy rely on the non-personhood of the extra-corporeal embryos. Usually, the argument 
refers to the properties that extra-corporeal embryos have in themselves, and somehow claiming 
that they do not have the same higher order capacities that embryos in-utero have (271). More 
specifically, Singer equates extra-corporeal embryos with the sperm and unfertilized egg before 
uniting, which cannot develop into human persons unless there is a deliberate human action, and 
the same, he argues, goes for extra-corporeal embryos (271). Here again however, a substance 
dualist can reply that egg and sperm become an entirely different entity when joined. Even from 
a naturalistic perspective, DNA is changed radically, and this is not the case for an embryo that is 
implanted. An embryo has within itself the potential to develop into an adult person, and is a 
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person already with such high-order capacities. It will not turn into a different entity, but rather 
develop to (ideally) display its full potentialities.   
 Obviously, if one believes that the person's life begins at conception (as a substance 
dualist will probably believe), then embryos are persons, and one should avoid their deaths if one 
can. Applied to any couples using reproductive technologies, this belief should engender a more 
careful use of processes such as in-vitro fertilization (like not fertilizing more eggs than the 
couple is willing to raise should they all develop) or any other attempts at impregnating. 
Furthermore, attempts should be made to minimize this in general. One could pursue different 
technologies (Moreland and Rae list the method of freezing the eggs, instead of the embryos, a 
method which is still undergoing its experimental phase) (279). 
 As far as cloning is concerned, the most serious concerns arise with eugenics, but 
viewing people as embodied persons, whose identity is grounded in the existence of individual 
souls, doesn't seem to pose any direct objection to cloning. There are already examples of 
different persons having almost identical DNA, and so long as the technology was not used for 
unethical purposes there's nothing in the idea itself that causes problems. However, it does seem 
to be a superfluous technology. One can imagine a plethora of ways it could be used immorally, 
perhaps because of that potential we should keep our hands off. I personally think that the 
superfluous nature of the technology is an ethical reason to direct funds elsewhere. 
 Complications arise again with end-of-life care. Procedures like physician-assisted 
suicide and euthanasia are the most controversial here, and one's views on what a human person 
is are extremely relevant (316). This cannot be determined by empirical investigations since the 
definitions are not dictated by the facts. For a dualist, patients in a permanent vegetative state 
(PVS), or in a coma, are still fully persons. For a physicalist, many of the attributes that seem to 
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constitute personhood have been lost, giving the appearance that one can separate the human 
organism from the human person. But that separation, forgive the repeating, makes little sense 
from a physicalist perspective. The distinction being ignored is that one's lack of displaying a 
first-order capacity does not eliminate the presence of a higher-order capacity.  
 Perhaps a concern for physicalists is that if we grant full-personhood to such patients, we 
will not be able to withhold life-support from patients who request it in advance-directives 
should they one day be in a PVS, or from comatose patients for whom even basic functions like 
breathing are now being artificially continued, or patients for whom death is imminent and 
continued treatment will only prolong their suffering. However, this is not the necessarily 
conclusion of such a premise. Person's wishes should be respected with regards to life-sustaining 
treatment should they find themselves in a PVS or comatose state. Further, there are situations in 
which prolonging the life of a patient is indeed to inflict more suffering than is necessary. For 
such cases there is not a "prolong life at any cost" rule that is wedded to a dualist perspective of 
persons (337). One thing that would be maintained however, is a resistance to physician assisted 
suicide, on the grounds that suicide in itself is not good, the real possibility that non-voluntary 
euthanasia naturally increases with the legality of voluntary euthanasia, and the fact that there are 
extremely few cases where pain relief cannot be adequate. In this vein, Moreland and Rae 
acknowledge that there need to be looser reigns on doctors' abilities to administer pain-relieving 
drugs like morphine in higher doses so that patients who are terminally ill can die without 
unnecessary suffering (341). 
Regardless of one's position on any of these issues, it is obvious that the central issue is what 
constitutes personhood, and I am continuing to argue that substance dualism does the best job of 
accounting for personhood. 	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VII.	  Some	  Objections	  to	  Dualism	  
 We have seen that there are many objections to physicalism. Thinking about the gravity 
of some of them spurs the question of why one would not take up dualism as the most probable 
truth about human nature. Well, the philosophically relevant reason is that there are also 
objections to dualism which seem, to some, to have weighty significance. I'll address some of 
these objections now, with as much clarity as is possible in a limited space. Most of the 
philosophers from whom I derive these answers have written more extensively though, and I 
encourage an exploration of the rigorous defenses.  
 
What’s the Soul Made Up Of? 
The first objection is expressed well by Michael Levin who writes:  
 
The trouble, I suggest, is this: we can say what sort of stuff a material thing is an 
individual piece of, while no one has any idea of the sort of stuff a self is an individual 
piece of…While there are descriptions that can identify a self, we cannot refer to it as a P 
of S [it is not a part of something else] (quoted in Plantinga, Materialism 121). 
 
Plantinga deals with this objection fairly effectively, I think. The essence of the reply is 
that, if this objection is supposed to seriously move someone from dualism to physicalism, or in 
that direction, it would also cast doubt on the existence of many other things we believe exist 
(124). Think of a property, a proposition, or a set, or a number, or an electron, or the quantum 
field that the electron is a part of. What is a property made up of? What is a proposition made up 
of? What is a set made up of (its members obviously, but the set itself does not seem to be a 
physical reality)? The questions become more puzzling. What are numbers made up of? What 
are top quarks made up of? That last question affects the physicalist also. As contemporary 
physics digs further into the bedrock of material reality, the question of what things are made up 
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of never seems to end, and the ultimate answer starts to transform into theoretical physics and 
entities whose composition we have no idea about (strings?). Does this count against the reality 
of matter itself? Does everything need to be made up of some other stuff?  
The answer to that last question is, in my opinion emphatically no. To maintain that idea 
seems incoherent anyway and threatens an infinite regress of things composed of other yet other 
things. What is more, a dualist believes that a person is a simple entity, not composed of 
anything, and that has been the line taken by almost all dualists. So it is in the end unclear to me 
how this objection is supposed to move a dualist. If one takes stock of all the problems of 
physicalism, feels like they should start to investigate dualism, and runs up against this objection 
or one similar to it, there should be no problem.  
Dualism Is Anti-Scientific 
Along the same lines, materialists often think of the existence of a non-material soul as a 
scientific postulate, one that is "designed to explain the phenomena, something that gets 
whatever warrant it enjoys by virtue of the excellence of the explanation it provides” (Plantinga, 
Materialism 124). I myself think that there is a viable way to defend dualism as a scientific 
hypothesis, and there is research underway that I believe will enable a dualist to contribute to the 
discussion in this way and discuss it in the next few sections. On the other hand, perhaps to the 
distaste of a strict empiricist, one can believe that human persons are souls because one believes 
that a purely physical thing cannot think, or have qualia, but human persons do think; or because 
purely physical things do not maintain their identity through time, whereas human persons do. 
The empirical data leave the question more than just open; they cast doubt on the physicalist's 
stance because of its explanatory failures. To take a different line, one could say that dualism 
does, at least, offer an alternative explanation of phenomena that physicalism gives implausible 
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accounts of. For example (again), how it is that humans think, or are conscious, or maintain 
identity through time? 
In particular, the idea that cognitive science is antithetical to dualism is loudly 
proclaimed. I personally deny this and affirm, as most dualists would, the intimate link between 
body and soul. Some think that the fact that damage to certain parts of the brain results in mental 
malfunction is a problem for the dualist, but I’ve never been able to makes much sense of the 
suggestion. In our embodied lives, interaction with the material world is mediated, even if only 
with a thin veil, and if the physiological structures by which we interact with the world are 
damaged, it only makes sense that the activity reliant upon them would be adversely affected. 
That the same occurs with mental diseases is still no problem for dualism. The brain is used to 
organize inputs and final outputs of our mental lives, and when the neurological order that these 
are founded on is in disarray, one's cognitive life will undoubtedly be the same. One can accept 
the correlations between loss of memory, or vision and the corresponding damage to parts of the 
brain. Some dualists are scientists who have significantly contributed to relevant fields, take 
Wilder Penfield's in his The Mystery of the Mind and John Eccles Facing Realty: Philosophical 
Adventures by a Brain Scientist (Plantings, Materialism 123). 
Mind Kiss Matter?  
The Energy Conservation and Interaction Objections 
Similarly, many thinkers feel that if an immaterial mind were to interact with the physical 
world, say with the brain or body, this would violate some fundamental law of physics, and 
wreak havoc in the physical universe (125). This is commonly dubbed the “interaction problem”. 
How an immaterial mind could interact with the physical world, seems to present such 
difficulties that some physicalists tout it as a deathblow to dualism. Dennett expresses the 
problem as follows:  
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A fundamental principle of physics is that any change in the trajectory of any physical 
entity is an acceleration requiring the expenditure of energy, and where is this energy to 
come from?…This confrontation of quite standard physics and dualism has been 
endlessly discussed since Descartes' own day, and is widely regarded as the inescapable 
and fatal flaw of dualism. (qtd. in Plantinga, Materialism 125) 
 
Offhand, a dualist might say that the law of conservation of energy applies to closed 
systems, and if souls exist, then ex-hypothesi the body is not a closed system (Materialism 126). 
As concerns the mind's causal power upon the physical, the objection is seldom supported by 
serious argument, but rather stated with rhetorical flourishes, based on the assumption that this 
interaction would be utterly inexplicable. However, on this point there are no empirical data that 
count against the possibility of an immaterial mind "causing" events in the physical world, and 
the arguments already discussed thus far should put the burden on the physicalist to explain how 
a physical thing could have a mental life like ours that is causally efficacious. Somewhat 
embarrassingly to this objection however, there are responses within our knowledge of the 
physical world itself that completely strip this objection of its perceived force.  
The objection in general is based on two assumptions. They are  
1. that the principle of energy conservation applies to all known purely physical 
interactions and  
2. that all causal interactions (or law-like connections) between events must involve an 
exchange of energy (Collins 125).  
I will be quoting heavily from Robin Collins' essay “The Energy of the Soul” to illuminate the 
Dualist response. We start by trying to understand how energy is measured in physics. Collins 
begins:  
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In classical mechanics, the total energy of an object is equal to the sum of the internal 
energy of a body and its kinetic energy, 1/2mv2. The latter quantity, however, will depend 
on the frame of reference from which the velocity of the object is measured. In special 
relativity, the frames of reference of interest are those moving at some uniform (non-
accelerating) speed relative to each other. These are called inertial frames of reference. 
(126) 
 
An example of an inertial frame of reference that Collins gives involves a train moving at 
the same speed with the ground, or, put more interestingly, a train moving at the same speed as a 
ball next to it (say the ball is moving on top of a car driving alongside the train at the same 
speed). Calculated from the train, the ball has no kinetic energy. But, calculated by people 
standing on the ground (while they themselves and the ground are both moving at the same 
speed) the ball and train will both have values for v in the kinetic energy formula (126). The end 
result of this basic feature of measurement is that “...unless we establish a preferred frame of 
reference, we cannot speak of the energy of the ball as being an intrinsic, non-relational property 
of it” (Collins 126).  
Collins draws out what this means for general and special relativity, the current 
framework in which we approach measurements of energy. “A central idea behind both the 
special theory of relativity and the general theory of relativity is that the laws of physics should 
be formulated in terms of quantities that are independent of one's frame of reference” (126). 
Since energy is not frame-independent, both special and general relativity posit replacement 
quantities. For special relativity, “the frame independent quantity that substitutes for energy is a 
four component entity called the energy-momentum vector” (126). For general relativity, this 
entity is “a sixteen-component tensor called the stress-energy tensor” (127). The energy-
momentum vector in special relativity and the stress-energy tensor in general relativity “can be 
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considered an intrinsic property of an object or system of particles and fields, but its energy 
cannot”(127). These quantities would serve us in giving some constant value for energy by 
which to measure energy and thus energy conservation, but complexities arise.  
Given the idea of frames of reference, and knowing that calculating the energy60 of a 
system itself is relative to a frame of reference, the energy conservation principle in physics, that 
Collins gives, is the “boundary version”. This version states: “the rate of change of total energy 
in a finite region of space is equal to the total rate of energy flowing through the spatial 
boundary” (127). So, one would subtract however much energy is being lost by the system from 
however much energy is being put into it. Calculating this would incorporate the stress-energy 
tensor, and this would result in a consistent way to formulate the energy conservation principle.  
The problem for the boundary version of energy conservation is that it does not hold for 
any region of our universe. This is because of gravitational energy; Collins explains, “typically 
one can neither define the total gravitational energy in a region of space nor the rate at which 
gravitational energy flows in or out of the region” (128). A reason for why we cannot do this is 
that we cannot calculate a stress-energy tensor for gravitational waves, and thus cannot formulate 
a “frame invariant quantity”, for gravitational energy or momentum. But, gravitational waves are 
constantly affecting all the matter in the universe. We can actually record the increase in non-
gravitational energy within a system without being able to identify any “physically definable 
energy flowing across the boundary of the region” (129). In other words, there's no precise 
method of measuring the energy coming in and out of a given local region of space without 
ignoring gravitational energy. This suggests that since there is no well-defined local conception 
of energy conservation, there is no global conception either, since gravity affects all matter and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 I'll copy Collins in just using “energy” now instead of “stress-energy”.  
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there's no precise way to define the energy for gravitational waves.61 Pushing this further, Collins 
quotes philosopher of science Carl Hoefer's suggestion that because we have no trace of its 
source, or measurement of the total amount of gravitational energy pervading our universe, 
“energy gain in a gravity wave detector could be thought of as genuine gain, without having to 
say that the energy existed somewhere beforehand” (qtd. in Collins 129).  
Moving on to the problem of causality, there are established cases in quantum mechanics 
where physical particles interact without any exchange of energy. Collins uses “particle spin” to 
illustrate this point. In quantum mechanics all particles have a spin with a value of +1, -1, +1/2,   
-1/2, or 0, and this value never changes except as being either positive or negative. If we split a 
nitrogen molecule (composed of two nitrogen atoms), which has a spin of zero, in a spaceship 
midway between Earth and Mars, send each atom to a separate planet, and then have someone on 
each planet measure their spins in a pre-determined direction, each person will either measure a 
spin of +1/2 or -1/2, and what their measurements are will be anti-correlated (131).  
One naturally thinks that each particle's spin was determined when they were split, and 
then the instruments measured the results. If this explanation were correct, it would be explaining 
via only “local causation”. When the atoms were split, there was no significant spatial distance 
between them and the mechanism that gave them that spin. Later, when their spins were 
measured on different planets, there was no significant spatial distance between them and the 
apparatus that registered their spin (so their spin state caused the reading). I cannot possibly 
illuminate the full-story to rebut this, but it is has been well established via several different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Collins also points out the energy loss that most of the photons in the universe undergo, which we 
detect in cosmic redshift and rely on to calculate the rate of expansion of the universe and how far stars 
are. The energy lost by photons however, seemingly goes nowhere. Collins backs up the math of his 
argument extensively and will point the reader to the relevant physicists who have expressed the 
problem 
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experiments all under the umbrella of “Bell's Theorem” that local causation is not sufficient to 
explain the anti-correlation62. 
But, all energy exchange involves local causation, so the correlations cannot be explained 
via energy exchange. The two responses to this fact in quantum mechanics are categorized as 
“causal realist” and “causal anti-realist” interpretations. The causal realist response is that there 
is some “instantaneous causal connection between the two particles or in some non-local and 
thus instantaneously acting common cause” (132). The causal anti-realist response is that these 
correlations cannot be explicated further (132). If you take the realist response, you're accepting 
that there are causal connections that don't require energy-exchange. If you adopt the anti-realist 
response, then requiring that forms of dualism that posit law-like correlations between the mind 
and the brain to explain their correlations further is to ask of immaterial-material interactions 
something that not even physical-physical interactions provide (132).  
These two results, the inability of physics to delineate a consistent energy-conservation 
principle or a theory of physical causation which requires energy exchange, completely strips the 
energy-conservation principle objection against dualism and casts doubt on the force of 
objections directed at the implausibility of causation without energy exchange.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 I refer the readers to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s article on “Bell’s Theorem” for their 
own personal confirmation.  
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VIII.	  A	  Dualist	  Interpretation	  of	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  
 
Philosopher of Physics Hans Halvorson, in his essay The Measure of All Things: 
Quantum Mechanics and the Soul, delineates how a dualist perspective on human nature can 
help explain some paradoxes that have arisen over the past several decades concerning the 
behavior of the universe’s elementary physical particles. Specifically, Halvorson outlines how 
Dualism can contribute to our understanding of the “measurement problem” and the collapse of 
the “wave-function”. I’ll first explain the concepts needed to understand the problem.  
Quantum Superpositions 
 First, there’s the idea of superposition. Coming into the 20th century, physicists devised 
an experiment to determine whether the newly discovered negative charge on the outer skirts of 
an electron is carried by waves or by particles. The test was to send negative charge to an optical 
detector screen from some source, but to place a barrier with two doors in-between the source 
and detector, and, like all scientific experiments, to change the independent variables and see 
what happened (143). If negative charge is carried by particles, then there should be discrete 
lumps on the detector behind each door signifying where the particles hit (see diagram 1 on next 
page). If negative charge is carried by waves, then there will be a diffuse mark on the whole 
detector, plus a specific pattern indicating where the waves interfered with each other if both 
doors are open (diagram 2 on next page). 
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Diagram 1: Two-slit experiment (results for particles) 
 
Diagram 2: Two-slit experiment (results for waves) 
 
(diagrams obtained from wikibooks “Materials in Electronics/Wave-Particle Duality/The Two-
Slit Experiment”) 
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Now, say we keep the negative charge source on and keep both doors open. If negative 
charge is carried by particles we should expect for there to be two lumps, one behind each door. 
Instead, we see a diffuse pattern on the optical screen, like in Diagram 2. However, there had 
already been experiments giving strong empirical evidence that negative charge was carried by 
particles, electrons, but this experiment contradicted that. Only waves can create that interference 
pattern, it so it seemed as though negative charge was carried by waves. Even when one shoots 
only the minutest amount of negative charge at a time (one electron at a time), the diffraction 
pattern still appears, and this seems to be undeniable evidence that negative charge is carried by 
waves. However, skeptical of this result and wanting more confirmation, another experiment was 
devised which placed a detector over each door and see if both detectors went off, as should 
happen:  
the result is surprising: in any particular run of the experiment when the detectors are 
turned on exactly one detector goes off (confirming that electrons are localized particles). 
But when these detectors are turned on [and both doors are open], the interference pattern 
on the optical screen disappears, and instead we get the two-lump pattern on the optical 
screen. It is as if the electron behaves like a particle in the presence of the detectors, but 
like a wave when there are no detectors (Halvorson 143) 
 
 So, the physicists who made these discoveries “invented a new concept called the 
‘quantum superposition of two states’ and they claimed that when both doors are open…the 
electron is in a quantum superposition of passing through the left and right doors” (Halvorson 
144). The notation for this state is:  “|left>+|right>”. This means that until we detect it, the 
electron does not have a position, period. Here we make an important note, one cannot think that 
this superposition state is the result of our ignorance about which door the electron will go 
through, because when there are no detectors the electrons produce a diffuse pattern on the 
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optical screen which would not make sense if they did in fact acted like particles! However, 
when we do make try to find the electron with detectors, the superposition state |left>+|right> 
does work like a probability. Half the time we’ll detect it in the left door, the other half of the 
time we’ll detect it in the right door (144). So, electrons act like waves with no localized position 
in space. But when measured, they act like particles. This is what physicists call the “collapse of 
the wave function” (144).  
 Collins explains that all quantum states are superpositions. The state |left> in our 
experiment is itself a superposition of two other states:   
|moving>… 
in which the electron is moving, and the state 
|stationary>… 
in which the electron is stationary (145) 
The state |left>, remember, meant that we were seeing the electron pass through the left door via 
a detector. What the superposition above means is that, should we detect the electron going 
through the left door, we could find its position or its velocity, but not both. An electron is not 
stationary (not in a position) when moving, nor does it have a velocity (its not moving) when in a 
position, and neither until we make a measurement63. An electron always is missing some 
indeterminate values that normal physical objects should have, it’s always in a superposition. 
This leads to the next concept, “entanglement”.  
The Snow Leopard’s not Dead 
Entanglement and Linear Dynamics 
Suppose two electrons, Allie (A) and Bryna (B), are going to be in two separate two-slit 
experiments (146). Quantum mechanics can describe the combination of both states as:  
(|left>A + |right>A)(|left>B + |right>B) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 I leave it to the reader to do further research in how this is so, there are a plethora of non-technical 
books on the basics of Quantum Mechanics.  
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or, validly applying the distributive function:  
|left>A|left>B + |left>A|right>B + |right>A|left>B + |right>A|right>B   
 
This last state describes all the possible outcomes for the measurements taken of the two 
electrons. But remember, it is a superposition. Therefore, neither of the electrons is actually in 
these states until the wave function collapses (147).  
It has been established through a series of experiments dubbed “Bell’s inequality” that 
not only can two states of an individual electron be in a superposition, but also two states that are 
each made up of two electrons. So, let’s say that the two electrons are in the superposition state: 
|left>A|left>B + |right>A|right>B. Halvorson short hands this state |E>, and I’ll follow suit. |E> says 
that “if we perform a joint position-position measurement, we will always get the same result for 
both electrons” the two electrons always go through the same door. (147).  
 Entanglement is the realization that in state |E> , neither A or B have any determinate 
properties at all (148). This is because A cannot be in state |left>, since |E> says it could go 
through the left door. A is not in the state |left> + |right>, because this would mean that A may 
go through a door that B does not go through, but that’s not possible in state |E>. So, A is not in 
any state, Halvorson says that A’s “quantities – position, velocity, etc. – lack determinate values” 
(148). 
 Entanglement is a problem because everything is made up of elementary particles that 
obey the laws of quantum mechanics, and there have been no experiments indicating a “cut-off 
point” (148). Say you take two particles that are parts of the heart of a snow leopard together 
with 5,000 more particles in their vicinity, and describe the state of that “composite system” 
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(148)64. All the elementary particles will have been in superpositions just like A&B in our earlier 
example, and so when you describe the state of the resulting system, you will have to list all the 
possible combination of states it may be in. In other words, the system is in a superposition of 
states, and one could theoretically continue this process all the way up until one describes the 
state of the entire snow leopard, resulting in a ridiculous amount of possible states, even the 
superposition of |dead>+|alive>, in which our feline “has no state at all, is neither alive nor dead, 
is not awake or asleep, etc.” (148). One can now see a hint of what the problem will be. Our 
experience seems to deny that macro-objects are in superpositions of states, at any given moment 
the snow leopard seems to be either alive or dead, either asleep or awake, but not both.  
 The last concept needed to understand what will be the most troubling consequence of 
quantum mechanics, is linear dynamics. Classical physics used to postulate deterministic laws 
for how deterministic systems would change over time; quantum mechanics postulates a similar 
law (the Schrodinger equation) according to which whatever the state a quantum system is now 
will determine its future quantum state. The problem is that superpositions are maintained 
through change. Halvorston states:  
 
If the state |S> were to evolve into the state |S’>, and if the state |T> were to evolve into 
the state |T’>, then the superposition state |S>+|T> would evolve into |S’+|T’ (149). 
 
The “measurement problem” is a troubling description of the physical world if linear dynamics, 
the existence of quantum superpositions, and entanglement are true. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 This is an over-simplified version of the notorious “Schrodinger Cat” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  99	  	  
Not So Super: 
The Measurement Problem  
 Halvorson paints the following scenario and quotes philosopher David Albert to describe 
what will be the concluding dilemma of our excursion into quantum mechanics. Imagine we set 
up the two-slit experiment we described earlier and attached a computer monitor to the detectors. 
The state of the electron before the experiment, remember, is the superposition: |left>E+|right>E.  
We could label the state of the computer monitor before the electron is shot as: |readyM>. So, we 
could describe the combined state of the computer and the electron as the superposition: 
|readyM>(|left>E+|right>E). This is the same as: |readyM>|left>E+|readyM|right>E. If the left detector 
goes off, the computer screen will display “left”, and it will display “right” if the right detector 
goes off. Now, let’s say the electron is shot. According to linear dynamics, superpositions are 
preserved, so the superposition of the monitor-electron system will evolve into another 
superposition: |leftM>|left>E+|rightM|right>E. But, recalling our discussion of entanglement, this 
means that the monitor will not display left or right, because it could display the other depending 
on what the electron does, and it cannot be in a superposition, because the electron is what 
determines what it’s supposed to read, but the electron is still in a superposition! So, the monitor 
will not read anything at all because any state it could be in results in a contradiction with the 
predicted result of quantum mechanics! 
 Add a human observer to this weird mix. Desmond is looking at the monitor before the 
electron is shot. The state of the composite system of Desmond, the monitor and the electron is a 
superposition, namely: 
 
|readyD|readyM>|left>E+|readyD|readyM|right>E 
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Now, if the monitor comes to display “right” Desmond will believe that it says “right”, he’ll be 
in the state: |rightD> If the monitor comes to display “left” Desmond will believe it says left, he’ll 
be in state: |leftD However, remember what happened with the computer. Assuming that 
Desmond is, like the monitor, a reliable detector, his state is dependent upon the final state of the 
monitor, but the monitor will evolve according to linear dynamics! So, the final state of the 
Desmond-monitor-electron system will be:  
|leftD|leftM>|left>E+|rightD|rightM|right>E 
This means that Desmond will not believe anything about what the monitor says.  
 I repeat, quantum mechanics, what Halvorson dubs “the best physical theory in history”, 
predicts that when Desmond, or any human being, makes an observation on the monitor, or any 
observation, they will be in a quantum superposition in which they will observe neither one 
option in the scenario nor another. Our experience demonstrably falsifies this prediction. When 
we make an observation, we observe one thing, not its contradictory, and we certainly do observe 
something. We have definite experiences of both sensory observation and belief formation that 
are not in superpositions (I do not believe both that the traffic light has turned green and that it 
has not). This is recognized as a serious problem. So much of a problem that great energy and 
ingenuity has gone into saving the theory of quantum mechanics by rejecting one of its 
assumptions and/or developing an alternate theory of the universe as a whole.  
 We will not delve into all these different methods, but I refer the reader to two books 
Halvorson suggests for varying interpretations. One is D.Z. Albert’s Quantum Mechanics and 
Experience, the other is Jeffrey Barrett’s The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds. I will 
briefly state how dualism, the thesis that humans are immaterial minds, souls, and not purely 
physical entities can resolve the problem.  
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Soul Scientists: 
The Dualist Interpretation 
In the preceding chapters, we noted how a physicalist view on human nature leads to 
varying difficulties, some tolerable, some, I argue, insurmountable. Let’s say that we consider 
dualism a viable option now. Given that possibility, what would one say to the measurement 
problem? Well, return to Desmond and the state composed of himself, the monitor, and the 
electron (DME hereafter). According to quantum mechanics, the components of this system will 
all evolve into a superposition in which the monitor and Desmond are entangled with the 
electron and each other. Thus, the monitor does not display “right” or “left”, and Desmond does 
not observe anything. The dualist throws a wrench in the problem because, according to a 
dualist, mental states are not made up of the elementary physical particles that govern the 
behavior of quantum dynamics, and thus, there’s no prima facie reason to think that mental states 
are superposable65. We saw at the beginning of this discussion that the reason physicists invented 
the idea of a quantum superposition is that it had explanatory power; it explained how an 
electron could produce a diffraction pattern in the two-slit experiment. There is no observational 
data that the “superpositions of mental states” would help explain. If anything, it contradicts 
observational data. However, if mental states cannot enter into superpositions, they cannot 
become entangled, and so, though the state of (DME) before the electron goes through a slit in 
the experiment is: 
|readyD|readyM>|left>E+|readyD|readyM|right>E      
and though this is supposed to result in an entangled state for both the monitor and Desmond, 
this postulate can be said to not apply in situations where the components of the system are not 
purely physical. Again, what phenomenon would the superposition of mental states explain? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Halvorson cites Chalmer’s suggestions in The Conscious Mind as intimating that this is the solution to 
the measurement problem that people should be taking into consideration.  
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 Hans Halvorson cites physicist Henry Stapp’s recent book Mindful Universe: Quantum 
Mechanics and the Participating Observer and his intriguing essay Quantum Theory and the 
Role of Mind in Nature, as more detailed scientific expositions of how individual conscious 
subjects play important explanatory roles in our contemporary understanding of the universe, and 
why this needs to be recognized not only in physics, but in psychology and neuroscience as well. 
One can look into Stapp’s other works and lectures to glean the arguments and well-supported 
evidence for his position. Additionally dualism can contribute to the already existing “Ghirardi-
Rimini-Weber collapse theory” (GRW) according to which there are extremely rare spontaneous 
collapses of the wave function. But, there are so many particles in even what we would call a 
“small” object that this happens frequently enough. Since two particles that are entangled will 
both collapse if one does, all the particles that compose macro-objects collapse, and the object 
will obtain definite properties, just as we observe them to have. Dualism can contribution to our 
understanding of these spontaneous collapses of the wave function. Halvorson says that in GRW, 
“the collapse dynamics seems to be ad hoc, and put in by hand to solve the measurement 
problem” (162). For a dualist, these theorized collapses would not be random and spontaneous, 
but directed by conscious decisions of immaterial minds under indeterministic laws governing 
brain-body interaction (Stapp provides frameworks for how to develop this). The dualist 
perspective, undergirded by independent evidence, can underwrite the development of this 
theory and give it grounds.  
One may reply skeptically at first. Is not the postulation of the soul, or an immaterial 
mind simply ad-hoc in this situation? Well, no. As I’ve argued throughout this thesis, dualism 
makes the most sense of our experience prima facie, and there are many reasons not to be a 
physicalist. Now we’ve come to a physical theory that can escape the charge of contradiction and 
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incoherence if interpreted with a dualist, rather than a physicalist, metaphysics. From what I’ve 
seen in my research, this trend is on the rise, rather than fading away. 
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X.	  Conclusion	  
 I want to take a step back and mention my original rationale for writing this thesis. The 
desire was undergirded by many shifts in my personality, beliefs, and interests that have occurred 
in the three years I’ve been an undergraduate. The two most important are my conversion to 
Christianity before my sophomore year, and a newfound, very intense desire to discover reality 
(what is true about the universe and our place in it?). One could oppose this desire to discover 
reality to a mindset that says: “Well, maybe what I believe is false, but I’m comfortable believing 
it.” It is easy to see how a false view of reality can put one in danger; imagine jumping from a 
helicopter while trusting a parachute that, in reality, is defunct. I admit, this danger is not so 
easily seen when it comes to some of our other beliefs, but our conception of what we are 
underlies virtually everything else we do. To use a phrase I’m not so fond of, it’s a belief that 
“cashes out” so much that it’s hard to trace the paper trail back to it.  
I have presented arguments directed towards the physicalist enterprise as a whole. The 
second section was probably least persuasive to anyone who already was a physicalist, but I 
extended Plantinga’s example to include a possible wrinkle in the data collection that would 
require a physicalist to abandon the naive principle  “just following the evidence”. The third and 
fourth sections were connected in their question for the physicalist: how does physicalism make 
sense of our mental lives? My fifth section was all too brief for the topic, but I refer the reader to 
my source, and I think that Plantinga’s case, though it runs counter to some modern assumptions 
about evolutionary biology, is actually very potent in that it attacks the source of all our 
judgments. I also pointed out why the personal identity of a human being is seated in the mind, 
which possesses what Moreland and Rae call an “individuating principle”. The implications for 
this in ethics can be revolutionary. Of course, we would need a serious paradigm switch, but 
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nothing’s to say that such a switch is impossible. My last two sections are meant to intrigue. One 
has to do the research and reach their own conclusions. But its aim is to point out that both 
scientists and philosophers are taking dualism as a serious possibility. This indicates there is still 
openness in the debate, and that is encouraging.  
Over the past nine months, the research noted here has put me in a position where the 
most rational thing for me to do is to think that human consciousness and cognition are not solely 
physical enterprises. Whatever aspect of this thesis stirred the most curiosity is what I encourage 
others to look at more carefully. But, that much is necessary, some effort to try and make sense 
of the views at hand. At the least, I hope these ruminations are exercises that sharpen my and 
future reader’s abilities to get-at what the truth is, not only for the question of human nature, but 
also for our understanding of the universe as a whole.  
	  	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  106	  	  Works	  Cited	  Battaglia-­‐Mayer,	  Alexandra	  and	  Roberto	  Caminiti.	  "Optic	  ataxia	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  breakdown	  of	  the	  global	  tuning	  fields	  of	  parietal	  neurones."	  Brain	  125.2	  (2002):	  225-­‐237.	  Bermudez,	  Jose.	  "Arguing	  for	  Eliminativism."	  Paul	  Churchland.	  Ed.	  Brian	  L.	  Keeley.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006.	  32-­‐65.	  Boghossian,	  Paul	  A.	  "The	  Status	  of	  Content."	  The	  Philosophical	  Review	  99.2	  (1990):	  157-­‐184.	  Brown,	  Curtis.	  "Narrow	  Mental	  Content."	  2008.	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Winter	  2008	  edition).	  2011	  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/content-­‐narrow/>.	  Churchland,	  Paul.	  "Eliminative	  Materialism	  and	  the	  Propositional	  Attitudes."	  The	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy	  78	  (1981):	  67-­‐90.	  Collins,	  Robin.	  "The	  Energy	  of	  the	  Soul."	  The	  Soul	  Hypothesis	  Investigationg	  into	  the	  Existence	  of	  the	  Soul.	  Ed.	  Mark	  Baker	  and	  Steward	  Goetz.	  New	  York:	  The	  Continuum	  International	  Publishing	  Group	  Inc.	  ,	  2011.	  123-­‐137.	  Crisp,	  Thomas	  M.	  "Gettier	  and	  Plantinga's	  Revised	  Account	  of	  Warrant."	  Analysis	  60.1	  (2000):	  42-­‐50.	  Dennett,	  Daniel.	  The	  Intentional	  Stance.	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1996.	  Dretske,	  Fred.	  Naturalizing	  The	  Mind.	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  1997.	  Halvorson,	  Hans.	  "The	  Measure	  of	  All	  Things:	  Quantum	  Mechanics	  and	  the	  Soul."	  The	  Soul	  Hypothesis:	  Investigations	  into	  the	  Existence	  of	  the	  Soul.	  New	  York:	  The	  Continuum	  Publishing	  Group,	  2011.	  138-­‐167.	  Horgan,	  Terence	  and	  James	  Woodward.	  "Folk	  Psychology	  is	  Here	  to	  Stay."	  The	  Philosophical	  Review	  94.2	  (1985):	  197-­‐226.	  Inwagen,	  Peter	  Van.	  Metaphysics.	  Boulder:	  Westview	  Press,	  2009.	  —.	  "Plantinga's	  Replacement	  Argument."	  2007.	  Department	  of	  Philosophy//University	  of	  Notre	  Dame.	  2010	  <http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/van-­‐inwagen-­‐peter/documents/PlantRplArg4.doc>.	  Madell,	  Geoffrey.	  Mind	  and	  Materialism.	  Edinburgh:	  Edinburgh	  University	  Press,	  1988.	  —.	  "The	  Road	  to	  Substance	  Dualism."	  Royal	  Institute	  of	  Philosophy	  Supplements	  67	  (2010):	  45-­‐60.	  Moreland,	  J.P.	  and	  Scott	  Rae.	  Body	  &	  Soul:	  Human	  Nature	  &	  the	  Crisis	  in	  Ethics.	  Madison:	  InterVarsity	  Press,	  2000.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cumplido	  	  	  107	  	  Plantinga,	  Alvin.	  "Against	  Materialism."	  January	  2006.	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Department	  of	  Philosophy.	  <http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/plantinga-­‐alvin/documents/AGAINSTMATERIALISM.pdf>.	  —.	  "Content	  and	  Natural	  Selection."	  University	  of	  Notre	  Dame	  Department	  of	  Philosophy.	  <http://philosophy.nd.edu/people/all/profiles/plantinga-­‐alvin/documents/CONTENTANDNATURALSELECTION.pdf>.	  Plantinga,	  Alvin.	  "Introduction:	  The	  Evolutionary	  Argument	  against	  Naturalism."	  Naturalism	  Defeated?	  Essays	  on	  Plantinga's	  Evolutionary	  Argument	  against	  Naturalism.	  Ed.	  James	  Beilby.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  1-­‐14.	  Plantinga,	  Alvin.	  "Materialism	  and	  Christian	  Belief."	  Persons:	  Human	  and	  Divine.	  Ed.	  Peter	  Van	  Inwagen	  and	  Dean	  Zimmerman.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007.	  99-­‐141.	  Plantinga,	  Alvin.	  "Reply	  to	  Beilby's	  Cohorts."	  Naturalism	  Defeated?	  Essays	  on	  Plantinga's	  Evolutionary	  Argument	  against	  Naturalism.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2002.	  204-­‐276.	  Putnam,	  Hilary.	  "Brains	  in	  a	  vat."	  Knowledge:	  Readings	  in	  Contemporary	  Epistemology.	  Ed.	  Sven	  Bernecker	  and	  Fred	  Dretske.	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  385-­‐399.	  Ravenscroft,	  Ian.	  "Folk	  Psychology	  as	  a	  Theory."	  2010.	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	  (Fall	  2010	  Edition).	  Ed.	  Edward	  N.	  Zalta.	  <<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/folkpsych-­‐theory/>>.	  Taliaferro,	  Charles.	  Consciousness	  and	  the	  Mind	  of	  God.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1994.	  	  	  
	  
